Monday, April 11, 2011

The Junkers Ju 87 or Stuka two-seater ground-attack aircraft



The Junkers Ju 87 or Stuka (from Sturzkampfflugzeug, "dive bomber") was a two-seat (pilot and rear gunner) German ground-attack aircraft. Designed by Hermann Pohlmann, the Stuka first flew in 1935 and made its combat debut in 1936 as part of the Luftwaffe's Condor Legion during the Spanish Civil War.

The aircraft was easily recognizable by its inverted gull wings, fixed spatted undercarriage and its infamous Jericho-Trompete ("Jericho Trumpet") wailing siren, becoming the propaganda symbol of German air power and the Blitzkrieg victories of 1939–1942. The Stuka's design included several innovative features, including automatic pull-up dive brakes under both wings to ensure that the aircraft recovered from its attack dive even if the pilot blacked out from the high acceleration. Although sturdy, accurate, and very effective, the Ju 87 was vulnerable to modern fighter aircraft, like many other dive bombers of the war. Its flaws became apparent during the Battle of Britain; poor manoeuvrability, lack of speed and defensive armament meant that the Stuka required heavy fighter escort to operate effectively.

A Ju 87 B-2.

The Stuka operated with further success after the Battle of Britain, and its potency as a precision ground-attack aircraft became valuable to German forces in the Balkans Campaign, the African and Mediterranean Theaters and the early stages of the Eastern Front campaigns where Allied fighter resistance was disorganised and in short supply. Once the Luftwaffe had lost air superiority on all fronts, the Ju 87 once again became an easy target for enemy fighter aircraft. In spite of this, because there was no better replacement, the type continued to be produced until 1944. By the end of the conflict, the Stuka had been largely replaced by ground-attack versions of the Focke-Wulf Fw 190, but was still in use until the last days of the war. An estimated 6,500 Ju 87s of all versions were built between 1936 and August 1944.

Oberst Hans-Ulrich Rudel was the most notable Stuka ace and was the most highly decorated German serviceman of the Second World War. He was the only serviceman to receive the highest German military award, the Knight's Cross with golden Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds, on 29 December 1944.

Ernst Udet; the greatest proponent of the dive-bomber and the Ju 87.

The Ju 87's principal designer, Hermann Pohlmann, held the opinion that any dive-bomber design needed to be simple and robust. This led to many technical innovations, like the retractable undercarriage being discarded in favour of one of the Stuka's distinctive features, its fixed and "spatted" undercarriage. Pohlmann continued to carry on developing and adding to his ideas and those of Dipl Ing Karl Plauth (Plauth was killed in a flying accident in November 1927), and produced the Ju A 48 which underwent testing on 29 September 1928. The military version of the Ju A 48 was designated the Ju K 47.

The most notable feature of the Stuka was its inverted gull wings, as shown in this photograph. Also visible are the two separate sliding "hoods" of the canopy.

After the Nazis came to power, the design was given priority. Despite initial competition from the Henschel Hs 123, the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM) - German for the "Aviation Ministry" - turned to the designs of Herman Pohlmann of Junkers and co-designer of the K 47, Karl Plauth. During the trials with the K 47 in 1932, the double vertical stabilizers were introduced to give the rear gunner a better field of fire. The main, and what was to be the most distinctive, feature of the Ju 87 was its double-spar inverted gull wings. After Plauth's death, Pohlmann continued the development of the Junkers dive bomber. The Ju A 48 registration D-ITOR, was originally fitted with a BMW 132 engine, producing some 450 kW (600 hp). The machine was also fitted with dive brakes for dive testing. The aircraft was given a good evaluation and "exhibited very good flying characteristics".

Ernst Udet took an immediate liking to the concept of dive-bombing after flying the Curtiss Hawk II. When he invited Walther Wever and Robert Ritter von Greim to watch Udet perform a trial flight in May 1934 at the Jüterbog artillery range, it caused doubt about the ability of the dive bomber. Udet began his dive at 1,000 m (3,800 ft) and released his 1 kg (2 lb) bombs at 100 m (330 ft), barely recovering and pulling out of the dive. The Chief of the Air Weapons Command Bureau, Walther Wever, and the Secretary of State for Aviation, Erhard Milch, feared that such high-level nerves and skill could not be expected of "average pilots" in the Luftwaffe. Nevertheless, development continued at Junkers. Udet's "growing love affair" with the dive-bomber pushed it to the forefront of German aviation development. Udet went so far as to encourage all medium bombers to have dive-bombing capabilities.

Junkers Ju 87 B during the Battle of Stalingrad.

The design of the Ju 87 had begun in 1933 as part of the Sturzbomber-Programm. The Ju 87 was to be powered by the British Rolls-Royce Kestrel engine. Ten engines were ordered by Junkers on 19 April 1934 for £ 20,514/2/6 (twenty thousand, five hundred and fourteen pounds, two shillings and sixpence). The first Ju 87 prototype was built by AB Flygindustri in Sweden and secretly brought to Germany in late 1934. It was to have been completed in April 1935 but, due to the inadequate strength of the airframe, construction was not completed until October 1935. However, the mostly complete Ju 87 V1 W.Nr.c 4921 (less non-essential parts) took off for its maiden flight on 17 September 1935. The aircraft originally did not carry any registration, but later was given the registration D-UBYR. The flight report, by Hauptmann Willy Neuenhofen, stated the only problem was with the small radiator, which caused the power plant to overheat.

The Ju 87 V1, powered by a Rolls-Royce Kestrel engine V12 cylinder liquid-cooled engine, and with a twin-tail, crashed on 24 January 1936, killing pilot Willy Neuenhofen. The square twin fins and rudders proved too weak and, during dive testing, they collapsed and the aircraft crashed. The accident happened after the aircraft entered an inverted spin during the testing of the terminal dynamic pressure in a dive. The crash prompted a change of tail design to a single vertical stabilizer. To withstand strong forces during the dive, heavy plating was fitted, along with brackets riveted to the frame and longeron, to the fuselage. Other early additions included the installation of hydraulic dive brakes that were fitted under the leading edge and could rotate 90°.

The powerplant; a Jumo 211D installed in a Ju 87 B.

The RLM was still not interested in the Ju 87 and was not impressed that it relied on a British engine. In late 1935 Junkers suggested fitting a DB 600 in-line engine, while the final variant would be equipped with the Jumo 210. This was accepted by the RLM as an interim solution. The reworking of the design began on 1 January 1936. The test flight could not be carried out for over two months due to a lack of adequate aircraft. The 24 January crash at Kleutsch near Dresden had already destroyed one machine and killed Junkers' chief test pilot Willy Neuenhofen and his engineer Heinrich Kreft.

The second prototype was also beset by design problems. It had its twin stabilizers removed and a single tail fin installed due to fears over stability. Due to a shortage of power plants, instead of a DB 600, a BMW "Hornet" engine was fitted. All these delays set back testing until 25 February 1936. By March 1936 the second prototype, the V2, was finally fitted with the Jumo 210Aa power plant, which a year later was replaced by a Jumo 210 G (W.Nr. 19310). Although the testing went well, and the pilot, Flight Captain Hesselbach, praised its performance, Wolfram von Richthofen told the Junkers representative and Construction Office chief engineer Ernst Zindel that the Ju 87 stood little chance of becoming the Luftwaffe's main dive bomber as it was underpowered in his opinion. On 9 June 1936 the RLM ordered cessation of development, in favour of the Heinkel He 118, a rival design. Apparently, the next day Ernst Udet cancelled the order, and development continued.

Kette of Ju 87 Ds in flight, October/November 1943.

On 27 July 1936, Udet crashed the He 118 prototype, He 118 V1 D-UKYM. That same day, Charles Lindbergh was visiting Ernst Heinkel, and as a result, Heinkel could only communicate with Udet by telephone. According to this version of the story, Heinkel warned Udet about the propeller's fragility. Udet failed to consider this, so in a dive, the engine oversped and the propeller broke away. Immediately after this incident, Udet announced the Stuka the winner of the development contest.

Ju 87 G-2 "Kanonenvogel" with its twin Bordkanone BK 3.7, 37mm underwing gun pods.

Despite being chosen instead of the rival He 118, the design was still lacking and drew frequent criticism from Wolfram von Richthofen. Testing of the V4 prototype (A Ju 87 A-0) in early 1937 revealed several problems. The Ju 87 could take off in just 250 m (820 ft) and climb to 1,875 m (6,000 ft) in just eight minutes with a 250 kg (550 lb) bomb load, and its cruising speed was 250 km/h (160 mph). However, Richthofen pushed for a more powerful engine. According to the test pilots the Heinkel He 50 had a better acceleration rate, and could climb away from the target area much more quickly, avoiding enemy ground and air defenses. Richthofen stated that any maximum speed below 350 km/h (217 mph) was unacceptable for those reasons. Pilots also complained that navigation and powerplant instruments were mixed together, and were not easy to read, especially in combat. Despite this, pilots praised the aircraft's handling qualities and strong airframe.

These problems were to be resolved by installing the Daimler-Benz DB 600 engine, but delays in development forced the installation of the Jumo 210 Da in-line engine. Flight testing began on 14 August 1936. Subsequent testing and progress fell short of Richthofen's hopes, although the machine's speed was increased to 280 km/h (173 mph) at ground level and 290 km/h (179 mph) at 1,250 m (4,000 ft), while maintaining its good handling ability.

A Ju 87D during wing installation.

The Ju 87 was a single-engined all-metal cantilever monoplane. It had a fixed undercarriage and could carry a crew of two. The main construction material was duralumin, and the external coverings were made of Duralumin sheeting. Parts that were required to be of strong construction, such as the wing flaps, were made of Pantal and its components made of Elektron. Bolts and parts that were required to take heavy stress were made of steel.

The Ju 87 was fitted with detachable hatches and removable coverings to aid and ease maintenance and overhaul. The designers avoided welding parts wherever possible, preferring moulded and cast parts instead. Large airframe segments were interchangeable as a complete unit, which increased speed of repair.

The airframe was also subdivided into sections to allow transport by road or rail. The wings were of standard Junkers double-wing construction. This gave the Ju 87 considerable advantage on take-off; even at a shallow angle large lift forces were created through the aerofoil, reducing take-off and landing runs.

In accordance with the Aircraft Certification Center for "Stress Group 5", the Ju 87 had reached the acceptable structural strength requirements for a dive bomber. It was able to withstand diving speeds of 600 km/h (373 mph) and a maximum level speed of 340 km/h (211 mph) near ground level, and a flying weight of 4,300 kg (9,480 lb). Performance in the diving attack was enhanced by the introduction of dive brakes under each wing, which allowed the Ju 87 to maintain a constant speed and allow the pilot to steady his aim. It also prevented the crew suffering extreme g forces and high acceleration during "pull-out" from the dive.

The fuselage had an oval cross-section and housed a water-cooled inverted-V inline engine. The cockpit was protected from the engine by a firewall ahead of the wing center section where the fuel tanks were located. At the rear of the cockpit the bulkhead was covered by a canvas cover which could be breached by the crew in an emergency, enabling them to escape into the main fuselage. The canopy was split into two sections and joined by a strong welded steel frame. The canopy itself was made of Plexiglas and each compartment had its own "sliding hood" for the two crew members.

Two Junkers Ju 87 Ds near completion.

The engine was mounted on two main support frames that were supported by two tubular struts. The frame structure was triangulated and emanated from the fuselage. The main frames were bolted onto the power plant in its top quarter. In turn the frames were attached to the firewall by universal joints. The firewall itself was constructed from asbestos mesh with dural sheets on both sides. All conduits passing through had to be arranged so that no harmful gases could penetrate the cockpit.

The fuel system comprised two fuel tanks in the center section of the port and starboard wings, each with 250 L capacity. The tanks also had a predetermined limit which, if passed, would warn the pilot via a red warning light in the cockpit. The fuel was injected via a pump from the tanks to the power plant. Should this shut down, it could be pumped manually using a hand-pump on the fuel cock armature.

The powerplant was cooled by a 10 L (3 US gal) ring-shaped aluminium water container that was situated between the propeller and engine. A further container of 20 L (5 US gal) was positioned under the engine. The control surfaces operated in much the same way as other aircraft, with the exception of the innovative automatic pull-out system. Releasing the bomb activated the pull-out system. It initiated the pull-out, or automatic recovery and climb, upon the deflection of the dive brakes. The pilot could override the system by exerting significant force on the control column and taking manual control.

The wing was the most unusual feature. It consisted of a single center section and two outer sections installed using four universal joints. The center section had a large negative dihedral (anhedral) and the outer surfaces a positive dihedral. This created the gull, or "cranked", wing pattern along the Ju 87's leading edge. The shape of the wing improved pilot-to-ground visibility and also allowed a shorter undercarriage height. The center section protruded only by 3 m (9 ft 10⅛ in) on either side.

The offensive armament was two 7.92 mm (.312 in) MG 17 machine guns fitted in each wing, operated by a mechanical pneumatics system from the pilot's control column. The rear gunner/radio operator operated one 7.92 mm (.312 in) MG 15 machine gun for defensive purposes.

The engine and propeller had automatic controls, and an auto-trimmer made the aircraft tail-heavy as the pilot rolled over into his dive, lining up red lines at 60°, 75° or 80° on the cockpit side window with the horizon and aiming at the target with the sight of the fixed gun. The heavy bomb was swung down clear of the propeller on crutches prior to release.

Ju 87 Bs over Poland, September/October 1939.

Flying at 4,600 m (15,000 ft), the pilot located his target through a bombsight window in the cockpit floor. The pilot moved the dive lever to the rear, limiting the "throw" of the control column. The dive brakes were activated automatically, the pilot set the trim tabs, retarded his throttle and closed the coolant flaps. The aircraft then rolled 180°, automatically nosing the aircraft into a dive. Red tabs protruded from the upper surfaces of the wing as a visual indicator to the pilot that, in case of a g-induced black-out, the automatic dive recovery system would be activated. The Stuka dived at a 60-90° angle, holding a constant speed of 500–600 km/h (350-370 mph) due to dive-brake deployment, which increased the accuracy of the Ju 87's aim.

When the aircraft was reasonably close to the target, a light on the contact altimeter came on to indicate the bomb-release point, usually at a minimum height of 450 m (1,500 ft). The pilot released the bomb and initiated the automatic pull-out mechanism by depressing a knob on the control column. An elongated U-shaped crutch located under the fuselage swung the bomb out of the way of the propeller, and the aircraft automatically began a 6 g pullout. Once the nose was above the horizon, dive brakes were retracted, the throttle was opened, and the propeller was set to climb. The pilot regained control and resumed normal flight. The coolant flaps had to be reopened quickly to prevent overheating.

Physical stress on the crew was severe. Human beings suffering more than 5 g forces in a seated position will suffer vision impairment in the form of a grey veil known to the Stuka pilots as "seeing stars". They lose vision while remaining conscious; after five seconds they black out. The Ju 87 pilot experienced the visual impairments most during "pull-up" from a dive.

Eric "Winkle" Brown, a British test pilot from the Royal Navy, and General Officer Commanding "Captured Enemy Aircraft Flight" section, tested the Ju 87 at RAE Farnborough. "I had a high opinion of the Stuka because I had flown a lot of dive-bombers and it’s the only one that you can dive truly vertically. Sometimes with the dive-bombers, pilots claim that they did a vertical dive. What a load of rubbish. The maximum dive is usually in the order of 60 degrees. In a dive when flying the Stuka, because it’s all automatic, you are really flying vertically. You feel that you are over the top and feel you are going that a way! The Vengeance and Dauntless were both very good but could dive no more than 60 or 70 degrees. The Stuka was in a class of its own."

Erhard Milch addressing a Ju 87 staffel on a Norwegian airfield.

Extensive tests were carried out by the Junkers works at their Dessau plant. It was discovered that the highest load a pilot could endure was 8.5 g for three seconds, when the aircraft was pushed to its limit by the centrifugal forces. At less than 4 g no visual problems or loss of consciousness were experienced. Above 6 g, 50% of pilots suffered visual problems, or "grey" out. With 40%, vision vanished altogether from 7.5 g onwards and black-out sometimes occurred. Despite this blindness the pilot could maintain consciousness and was capable of "bodily reactions". However, after more than three seconds half the subjects passed out. The pilot would regain consciousness two or three seconds after the centrifugal forces had dropped below 3 g and had lasted no longer than three seconds. In a crouched position, pilots could withstand 7.5 g and were able to remain functional for a short duration. In this position, Junkers concluded that ⅔ of pilots could withstand 8 g and perhaps 9 g for three to five seconds without vision defects which, under war conditions, was acceptable. During tests with the Ju 87 A-2 new technologies were tried out to reduce the effects of g forces. The pressurised cabin was of great importance during this research. Testing revealed that at high altitude even 2 g could cause the death of a crew in an unpressurised cabin and without appropriate clothing. This new technology, along with special clothing and oxygen masks, was researched and tested. When the United States Army occupied the Junkers factory at Dessau on 21 April 1945 they were impressed and interested in the medical flight tests with the Ju 87.

The concept of dive bombing became so popular among the leadership of the Luftwaffe that it became almost obligatory in new aircraft designs. Later bomber models like the Junkers Ju 88 the Dornier Do 217 for dive bombing. The Heinkel He 177 strategic bomber was initially supposed to have dive bombing capabilities, a requirement that contributed to the failure of the design.

Once the Stuka became too vulnerable to fighter opposition on all fronts, work was done to develop a replacement. None of the dedicated close-support designs on the drawing board progressed far due to the impact of the war and technological difficulties. So the Luftwaffe settled on the Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighter aircraft, with the Fw 190F becoming the ground-attack version. The Fw 190F started to replace the Ju 87 for day missions in 1943, but the Ju 87 continued to be used as a night nuisance-raider until the end of the war.

A Ju 87 B in the North African theatre, c. 1941-42.

The second prototype had a redesigned single vertical stabiliser and a 610 PS (449 kW, 602 hp) Junkers Jumo 210 A engine installed, and later the Jumo 210 Da. The first A series variant, the A-0, was of all-metal construction, with an enclosed cockpit. To ease the difficulty of mass production the leading edge of the wing was straightened out and the ailerons' two aerofoil sections had smooth leading and trailing edges. The pilot could adjust the elevator and rudder trim tabs in flight, and the tail was connected to the landing flaps, which were positioned in two parts between the ailerons and fuselage. The A-0 also had a flatter engine cowling, which gave the pilot a much better field of vision. In order for the engine cowling to be flattened, the engine was set down nearly .25 m (10 in). The fuselage was also lowered along with the gunner's position, allowing the gunner a better field of fire.

The RLM ordered seven A-0s initially, but then increased the order to 11. Early in 1937 the A-0 was tested with varied bomb loads. The underpowered Jumo 210 A, as pointed out by von Richthofen, was insufficient, and was quickly replaced with the Jumo 210 D power plant.

The A-1s differed from the A-0s only slightly. As well as the installation of the Jumo 210 D, the A-1 had two 220 L (60 US gal) fuel tanks built into the inner wing, but it was not armoured or protected. The A-1 was also intended to be fitted with two 7.92 mm (.312 in) MG 17 machine guns in each wing, but this was dropped due to excessive weight. The two that remained were fed a total of 500 rounds of ammunition, stored in the undercarriage "spats". The pilot relied on the Revi C 21C gun sight for the two MG 17s. The gunner had only a single 7.92 mm (.312 ) MG 15, with 14 drums of ammunition each containing 75 rounds. This represented a 150-round increase in this position over the Ju 87 A-0. The A-1 was also fitted with a larger 3.3 m (10.8 ft) propeller.

The Ju 87 was capable of carrying a 500 kg (1,100 lb) bomb, but only if not carrying the rear gunner/radio operator as, even with the Jumo 210 D power plant, the Ju 87 was still underpowered for operations with more than a 250 kg (550 lb) bomb load. All Ju 87 As were restricted to 250 kg (550 lb) weapons (although during the Spanish Civil War missions were conducted without the gunner).

The Ju 87 A-2 was retrofitted with the Jumo 210Da fitted with a two-stage supercharger. The only further significant difference between the A-1 and A-1 was the H-PA-III controllable-pitch propeller. By mid-1938, 262 Ju 87 As had been produced, 192 from the Junkers factory at Dessau, and a further 70 from Bremen. The new, more powerful, Ju 87 B model started to replace the Ju 87 A at this time.

Prototypes

* Ju 87 V1 : W.Nr 4921 Flown on 17 September 1935
* Ju 87 V2 : W.Nr 4922, registration D-IDQR. Flown on 25 February 1936. Flown again as registration D-UHUH on 4 June 1937
* Ju 87 V3 : W.Nr 4923 Flown on 27 March 1936
* Ju 87 V4 : W.Nr 4924 Flown on 20 June 1936
* Ju 87 V5 : W.Nr 4925 Flown on 14 August 1936

Production variants

* Ju 87 A-0 : Ten pre-production aircraft, powered by a 640 PS (471 kW, 631 hp) Jumo 210C engine.
* Ju 87 A-1 : Initial production version.
* Ju 87 A-2 : Production version fitted with an improved 680 PS (500 kW, 671 hp) Jumo 210E engine.

The Ju 87 B series was to be the first mass produced variant. The first variant, the Ju 87 B-0, was produced in small numbers. A total of six Ju 87 B-0s were produced, built from Ju 87 A airframes. Test flights began from the summer of 1937. A small number, at least three, served as conversion Cs or Es for potential naval variants. Most of the prototypes were conversions from the Ju 87 A-1.

The next major variant was the Ju 87 B-1 with a considerably larger engine, its Junkers Jumo 211D generating 1,200 PS (883 kW, 1,184 hp), and the fuselage and landing gear were completely redesigned. This new design was again tested in Spain, and after proving its abilities there, production was ramped up to 60 per month. As a result, by the outbreak of World War II the Luftwaffe had 336 Ju 87 B-1s on hand. The B-1 was also fitted with "Jericho trumpets", essentially propeller-driven sirens with a diameter of 0.7 m (2.3 ft) mounted on the wing's leading edge directly forward of the landing gear, or on the front edge of the fixed main gear fairing. This was used to damage enemy morale and enhance the intimidating effect of dive-bombing. After the enemy became used to it, they were to be withdrawn. The devices also caused a loss of some 20–25 km/h (10-20 mph) through drag. Instead some bombs were fitted with whistles installed on the fin of the bomb to produce the noise after release.

The trumpets were a suggestion from Generaloberst Ernst Udet (but some authors say they were an idea from Adolf Hitler himself). The Ju 87 B-2s that followed had some improvements and were built in a number of variants that included ski-equipped versions (the B-1 also had this modification), and at the other end, with a tropical operation kit called the Ju 87 B-2 trop. Italy's Regia Aeronautica received a number of the B-2s and named them the Picchiatello, while others went to the other members of the Axis, including Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. The B-2 also had an oil hydraulic system for closing the cowling flaps. This continued in all the later designs.

Production of the Ju 87 B started in 1937. 89 B-1s were to be built at Junkers' factory in Dessau and another 40 at the Weserflug plant in Bremen by July 1937. Production would be carried out by the Weserflug company after April 1938. But another 352 Ju 87 B-1s were built at Junkers up until March 1940. From August 1938 to March 1940 the Weserflug company produced 740 Ju 87s. In total an estimated 700 Ju 87 B-1s and 230 B-2s were delivered to the Luftwaffe of which 550 were built at Junkers. The remaining machines were built at Weserflug's Bremen factory.

A long range version of the Ju 87 B was also built, known as the Ju 87 R. They were primarily intended for anti-shipping missions. Internal fuel capacity was increased by adding two inner-wing 240 L (60 US gal) fuel tanks and by using two standardised Luftwaffe 300 L (80 US gal) capacity under-wing drop tanks. This increased capacity to 1,080 litres. Bomb carrying ability was reduced to a single 250 kg (550 lb) bomb if the aircraft was fully loaded with fuel.

The naval variant of the Ju 87 B was known as the Ju 87 C, and these were built to operate from the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin. The carrier was never completed, and all of these were converted back to the Ju 87 B standard. The Ju 87 R-1 had a B-1 airframe with the exception of a modification in the fuselage which enabled an additional oil tank. This was installed to feed the engine due to the increase in range after the addition of the extra fuel tanks.

The Ju 87 R-2 had the same airframe as the B-2, and strengthened to ensure it could withstand dives of 600 km/h (370 mph). The Jumo 211D in-line engine was installed, replacing the R-1s Jumo 211A. Due to an increase in overall weight by some 700 kg (1,540 lb), the Ju 87 R-2 was 30 km/h (20 mph) slower than the Ju 87 B-1 and had a lower service ceiling. The Ju 87 R-2 had an increased range advantage of 360 km (220 mi). The R-3 and R-4 were the last R variants developed. Only a few were built. The R-3 was an experimental tug for gliders and was installed with an expanded radio system which was installed so that the crew could communicate with the glider crew by way of the tow rope. The R-4 differed from the R-2 in the Jumo 211J powerplant. Like the R-3, it was produced only in limited numbers.

The Weserflug works at Bremen built 471 Ju 87 R-2s and 145 Ju 87 R-4s. 143 of the 145 built Ju 87 R-4s were delivered as two were destroyed on test flights. The tropicalised versions were initially named the Ju 87 B-2/U1. This was eventually designated the Ju 87 B-2 trop, equipped with tropical emergency equipment and sand filters for the powerplant.

Known prototypes

* Ju 87 V6 : W.Nr 0870027 Flown on 14 June 1937 (A-0 to B-0 conversion)
* Ju 87 V7 : W.Nr 0870028 Prototype of the Ju 87B, powered by a 1,000 PS (735 kW, 986 hp) Jumo 211A. Flown on 23 August 1937 (A-0 to B-0 conversion)
* Ju 87 V8 : W.Nr 4926 Flown on 11 November 1937
* Ju 87 V9 : W.Nr 4927 Flown on 16 February 1938 as D-IELZ. Flown again as WL-IELZ on 16 October 1939
* Ju 87 V15: W.Nr 0870321. Registration D-IGDK. Destroyed in a crash in 1942.
* Ju 87 V16: W.Nr 0870279. Registration GT+AX.
* Ju 87 V17 and Ju 87 V18 may never have been built.

On 18 August 1937 the RLM decided to introduce the Ju 87 Tr(C). The Ju 87 C was intended to be a dive and torpedo bomber for the Kriegsmarine. The type was ordered into prototype production and available for testing in January 1938. Testing was given just two months and was to begin in February and end in April 1938. The prototype V10 was to be a fixed wing test aircraft, while the following V11 would be modified with folding wings. The prototypes were Ju 87 B-0 airframes equipped with Jumo 211 A aero engines. Owing to delays the V10 was not completed until March 1938. It first flew on 17 March and was designated Ju 87 C-1. On 12 May the V11 also flew for the first time. By 15 December 1939 915 arrested landings on dry land had been made. It was found the arresting gear winch was too weak and had to be replaced. Tests showed the average braking distance was 20–35 metres. The Ju 87 V11 was designated C-0 on 8 October 1938. It was fitted out with standard Ju 87 C-0 equipment and better wing-folding mechanisms. The "carrier Stuka" was to be built at the Weserflug Company's Bremen plant between April and July 1940. Between July 1940 and August 1941 120 Ju 87 C-1s were built.

Among the "special" equipment of the Ju 87 C was a two seat rubber dinghy with signal ammunition and emergency ammunition. A quick fuel dump mechanism and two inflatable 750 L (200 US gal) bags in each wing and a further two 500 L (130 US gal) bags in the fuselage enabled the Ju 87 C to remain floating for up to three days in calm seas. On 6 October 1939, with the war already underway, 120 of the planned Ju 87 Tr(C)s on order at that point were cancelled. Despite the cancellation the tests continued using catapults. The Ju 87 C had a takeoff weight of 5,300 kg (11,700 lb) and a speed of 133 km/h (82 mph) on departure. The Ju 87 could be launched with a SC 500 kg (1,100 lb) bomb and four SC 50 kg (110 lb) bombs under the fuselage. The C-1 was to have two MG 17s mounted in the wing with a MG 15 operated by the rear gunner for defensive purposes. On 18 May 1940, production of the C-1 was switched to the R-1. The fleet of Ju 87 Cs that existed were lost throughout the war.

Known prototypes

* Ju 87 V10: Registration D-IHFH (changed to Stammkennzeichen of TK+HD). W.Nr 4928. First flown 17 March 1938
* Ju 87 V11: Registration TV+OV. W.Nr 4929. First flown 12 May 1938

The Eastern Front brought new challenges. A Ju 87 B-2 is fitted with ski undercarriage to cope with the winter weather, 22 December 1941.

Despite the Stuka's vulnerability to enemy fighters having been exposed during the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe had no choice but to continue its development as there was no replacement aircraft in sight. The result was the D-series. In June 1941 the RLM ordered five prototypes, the Ju 87 V21–25. A Daimler-Benz DB 603 powerplant was to be installed in the Ju 87 D-1, but it did not have the power of the Jumo 211 and performed "poorly" during tests and was dropped. The Ju 87 D-series had better streamlined oil- and water-coolers, and an aerodynamically refined cockpit with better visibility and space. In addition, armor protection was increased and a new dual-barrel 7.92 mm (.312 in) MG 81Z machine gun with an extremely high rate of fire was installed in the rear defensive position. The engine power was increased again, the Jumo 211 J-1 or Jumo 211P now delivering 1,420 PS (1,044 kW, 1,401 hp).

The fuel capacity of the Ju 87 D was also increased to 1,370 L (360 US gal). Tests at Rechlin revealed it made possible a flight duration of 2 hours and 15 minutes. With an extra two 300 L (80 US gal) fuel tanks it could reach four hours flight time. Production of the D-1 variant started in 1941 with 495 orders made. These aircraft were delivered between May 1941 and March 1942. The RLM wanted 832 machines produced from February 1941. The Weserflug company was tasked with their production. From June to September 1941, 40 Ju 87 Ds were expected to be built, increasing to 90 thereafter. Various production problems were encountered. Just one of the planned 48 was produced in July. Of the 25 the RLM hoped for in August 1941, none were delivered. Only in September 1941 did the first two of the planned 102 Ju 87s roll off the production lines. The shortfalls continued to the end of 1941. During this time the WFG plant in Bremen moved production to Berlin. Over 165 Ju 87s had not been delivered and production was only 23 Ju 87 Ds per month out of the 40 expected. By the Spring of 1942 to the end of production in 1944, 3,300 Ju 87s, mostly D-1s, D-2s and D-5s had been manufactured. The D-series saw extensive use in the Eastern Front and the Middle East. Bomb carrying ability was massively increased from 500 kg (1,100 lb) in the B-version to 1,800 kg (3,970 lb) in the D-version (max load for short ranges, overload condition), a typical bomb load ranged from 500-1,200 kg (1,100-2,650 lb).

The D-2 was a variant used as a glider tug by converting older D-series airframes. It was intended as the tropical version of the D-1. It was to have heavier armour to protect the crew from ground fire. The armour reduced its performance and caused the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe to "place no particular value on the production of the D-2". The D-3 was an improved D-1 with more armour for its ground-attack role. The D-3 was converted from D-2 status and equipped with the Jumo 211 J. A number of Ju 87 Ds were designated D-3Ns or D-3/ trops and fitted with night and tropical equipment. The D-4 designation applied to a prototype torpedo-bomber version which could carry a 750–905 kg (1,650-2,000 lb) aerial torpedo carried on a PVC 1006 B racks. The D-4 was to be converted from D-3 airframes and operated from the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin. Other modifications included a flame eliminator and, unlike earlier D variants, fitted with two 20 mm MG 151/20 cannon while the radio operator/rear gunner's ammunition supply was increased by 1,000 to 2,000 rounds.

The Ju 87 D-5 was based on the D-3 design and was unique in the Ju 87 series as it had wings 0.6 metres longer than previous variants. The powerplant was upgraded to the Jumo 211 P in-line engine with supercharger intercoolers. In August 1943, this was replaced with the Jumo 211 J-1. This engine increased rate of climb by 15 m/s (2,953 ft/min). With introduction of the Jumo 213 and increased power and climb rate, the lengthened wings were no longer needed. The window in the floor of the cockpit was reinforced and four, rather than the previous three, aileron hinges were installed. Higher diving speeds were obtained of 650 km/h (408 mph) up to 2,000 m (6,400 ft). Range was recorded as 715 km (443 mi) at ground level and 835 km (517 mi) at 5,000 m (16,400 ft).

Fuel capacity was in the form of one main 480 L (127 US gal) fuselage tank and two wing tanks of 150 L (40 US gal) capacity. Two 300 L (80 US gal) drop tanks could also be installed under the wings. The D-5 was also fitted with a 20 mm MG 151/20 cannon in each wing. Both magazines had a capacity of 180 rounds. The radio operator/gunner operated 7.92 mm (.312 in) MG 81Z. Ammunition loads usually ranged from 1,400 to 2,000 rounds. The D-6, according to "Operating instructions, works document 2097", was built in limited numbers to train pilots on "rationalised versions". However due to shortages in raw materials it did not go into mass production. The D-7 was another ground attack aircraft based on D-1 airframes upgraded to D-5 standard (armor, wing cannons, extended wing panels), while the D-8 was similar to the D-7 but based on D-3 airframes. The D-7 and D-8 were both were fitted with flame dampers, and could conduct night operations.

The Ju 87 E and F proposals were never built, and Junkers went straight onto the next variant. Another variant derived from the Ju 87 D airframe was called the Ju 87 H, and saw service as a dual-control trainer.

In January 1943 a variety of Ju 87 Ds became "test beds" for the Ju 87 G variants. At the start of 1943 the Luftwaffe test centre at Tarnewitz tested this combination from a static position. Oberst G. Wolfgang Vorwald noted the experiments were not successful, and suggested the cannon be installed on the Messerschmitt Me 410. However, testing continued, and on 31 January 1943 Ju 87 D-1 W.Nr 2552 was tested by a Hauptmann Hans-Karl Stepp near the Briansk training area. Stepp noted the increase in drag, which reduced the aircraft's speed to 259 km/h (162 mph). Stepp also noted that the aircraft was also less agile than the existing D variants. D-1 and D-3 variants operated in combat with the 37 mm (1.46 in) BK 37 cannon in 1943.

Known prototypes

* Ju 87 V 21. Registration D-INRF. W.Nr 0870536. Airframe conversion from B-1 to D-1. First flown on 1 March 1941.
* Ju 87 V 22 Registration SF+TY. W.Nr 0870540. Also airframe conversion from B-1 to D-1. First flown on 1 March 1941.
* Ju 87 V 23 Registration PB+UB. W.Nr 0870542. Also airframe conversion from B-1 to D-1. First flown on 1 March 1941.
* Ju 87 V 24 Registration BK+EE. W.Nr 0870544. Also airframe conversion from B-1 to D-1/D-4. First flown on 1 March 1941.
* Ju 87 V 25 Registration BK+EF. W.Nr 0870530. Also airframe conversion from B-1 to D-4 trop. First flown on 1 March 1941.
* Ju 87 V 30 is the only known prototype of the Ju 87 D-5. W.Nr 2296. First flown on 20 June 1943.
* Ju 87 V 26-28, Ju 87 V 31, and V 42-47 were experiments of unknown variants.

With the G variant, the aging airframe of the Ju 87 found new life as an anti-tank aircraft. This was the final operational version of the Stuka, and was deployed on the Eastern Front. The reverse in German military fortunes after 1943 and the appearance of huge numbers of well-armoured Soviet tanks caused Junkers to adapt the existing design to combat this new threat. The Hs 129 B had proved a potent ground attack weapon, but its large fuel tanks made it vulnerable to enemy fire, prompting the RLM to say "that in the shortest possible time a replacement of the Hs 129 type must take place." With Soviet tanks the priority targets, the development of a further variant as a successor to the Ju 87 D began in November 1942. On 3 November, Erhard Milch raised the question of replacing the Ju 87, or redesigning it altogether. It was decided to keep the design as it was, but to upgrade the powerplant to a Jumo 211J, and add two 30 mm (1.18 in) cannon. The variant was also designed to carry a 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) free-fall bomb load. Furthermore, the armoured protection of the Ilyushin Il-2 Sturmovik was copied, to protect the crew from ground fire now that the Ju 87 would be required to conduct low level attacks.

Hans-Ulrich Rudel, a Stuka ace, had suggested using two 37 mm (1.46 in) Flak 18 guns, each one in a self-contained under-wing gun pod, as the Bordkanone BK 3.7, after achieving success against Soviet tanks with the 20 mm MG 151/20 cannon. These gun pods were fitted to a Ju 87 D-1, W.Nr 2552 as "Gustav the tank killer". The first flight of the machine took place on 31 January 1943, piloted by Hauptmann Hans-Karl Stepp. The continuing problems with about two dozens of the Ju 88P-1, and slow development of the Hs 129B-3, each of them equipped with a large BK 7.5 cm (2.95 in) cannon in a conformal gun pod beneath the fuselage, meant the Ju 87 G was put into production. In April 1943 the first production Ju 87 G-1s were delivered to front line units. The two 37 mm (1.46 in) cannons were mounted in under-wing gun pods, each loaded with a 6-round magazine of armour-piercing Tungsten carbide ammunition. With these weapons the Kanonenvogel ("cannon-bird"), as it was nicknamed, proved spectacularly successful in the hands of Luftwaffe Stuka aces such as Rudel. The G-1 was converted from older D-series airframes retaining the smaller wing but without the dive brakes. The G-2 was similar to the G-1 except for use of the extended wing of the D-5. 208 G-2s were built and at least a further 22 more converted from D-3 airframes.

During the Battle of Kursk, only a handful of production Gs were committed. On the opening day of the offensive, Hans-Ulrich Rudel flew the only "official" Ju 87 G, although a significant number of Ju 87 D variants were fitted with the 37 mm (1.46 in) cannon, and operated as unofficial Ju 87 Gs before the battle. In June 1943, the RLM ordered 20 Ju 87 Gs as production variants. The G-1 influenced the design of the 1970s U.S. A-10 with Hans Rudel's book, Stuka Pilot being required reading for all members of the A-X project.

The Soviet Air Force practice of harassing German ground forces using antiquated Polikarpov Po-2 and R-5 biplanes at night to drop flares and fragmentation bombs, inspired the Luftwaffe to form its own Störkampfstaffeln (Harassment squadrons). On 23 July 1942, Junkers offered the Ju 87 B-2, R-2 and R-4s with Flammenvernichter ("flame eliminators"). On 10 November 1943, the RLM GL/C-E2 Division finally authorised the design in directive No. 1117. This new equipment made the Ju 87 more difficult to detect from the ground in darkness.

Pilots were also asked to complete the new "Blind Flying Certificate 3", which was especially introduced for this new type of operation. Pilots were trained at night, over unfamiliar terrain, and forced to rely on their instruments for direction. The Ju 87's standard Revi C12D gunsight was replaced with the new Nachtrevi ("Nightrevi") C12N. On some Ju 87s, the Revi 16D was exchanged for the Nachtrevi 16D. To ease the pilot's ability to see his instrument panel, a violet light was installed. On 15 November 1942, the Auxiliary Staffel were created. By mid-1943, Luftflotte 1 was given four Staffeln while Luftflotte 4 and Luftwaffe Kommando Ost (Luftwaffe Command East) were given six and two respectively. In the first half of 1943, 12 Nachtschlachtgruppen had been formed, flying a multitude of different types of aircraft, including the Ju 87, which proved itself ideally suited to the low-level slow flying needed.

Ju 87 D preparing for another mission against Soviet positions, winter 1942-43.

Despite teething problems with the Ju 87, the RLM ordered 216 Ju 87 A-1s into production and wanted to receive delivery of all machines between January 1936 and 1938. The Junkers production capacity was fully occupied and licensing to other production facilities became necessary. The first 35 Ju 87 A-1s were therefore produced by the Weserflug Aircraft Company Limited (WFG). By the 1 September 1939, 360 Ju 87 As and Bs had been built by the Junkers factories at Dessau and Weserflug factory in Bremen. By 30 September 1939, Junkers had received 2,365,196 Reichsmark (RM) for Ju 87 construction orders. For development orders the RLM paid another 243,646 RM. According to the Audit records in Berlin, by the end of the financial year on 30 September 1941, 3,059,000 RM had been spent on Ju 87 airframes. By 30 June 1940 697 Ju 87 B-1s and 129 B-2s alone had been produced. Another 105 R-1s and seven R-2s had been built.

The range of the B-2 was not sufficient and it was dropped in favour of the Ju 87 R long-range versions in the second half of 1940. The 105 R-1s were converted to R-2 status and a further 616 production R-2s were ordered. In May 1941 the development of the D-1 was planned. It was ordered into production by March 1942. However the expansion of the Junkers Ju 88 production lines to compensate for the withdrawal of Dornier Do 17 production meant this did not take place. The Weserflug plant in Bremen experienced production shortfalls. This prompted Erhard Milch to visit and threaten the company into meeting the RLM's Ju 87 D-1 requirements on 23 February 1942. To meet these demands, 700 skilled workers were needed. Skilled workers had been called up for military service in the Wehrmacht. Junkers were able to supply 300 German workers to the Weserflug factory, and as an interim, Soviet prisoners of war and Soviet civilians deported to Germany. Working around the clock the shortfall was made good. WFG received an official commendation. By May 1942 demand increased further. Chief of Procurement General Walter Herthel found that each unit needed 100 Ju 87s as standard strength and an average of 20 per month to cover attrition. Not until June–December 1942 did production capacity increase and 80 Ju 87s were produced per month.

By 17 August 1942, production had climbed rapidly after the Blohm & Voss BV 138 production was scaled down and licence work had shut down at WFG. Production now reached some 150 Ju 87 D airframes per month. But spare parts were failing to reach the same production levels. Undercarriage parts were particularly in short supply. Milch ordered production to 350 Ju 87s per month in September 1942. This was not achievable due to the insufficient production capacity in the Reich.

The RLM considered setting up production facilities to Slovakia. But this would delay production until the buildings and factories could be furnished with the machine tools. These tools were also in short supply, and the RLM hoped to purchase them from Switzerland and Italy. The Slovaks could provide 3,500–4,000 workers but no technical personnel. The move would only produce another 25 machines per month at a time when demand was increasing. In October, production plans were dealt another blow when one of WFGs plants burned down leaving a chronic shortage of tailwheels and undercarriage parts. Junkers Director and a member of the Luftwaffe industry council Carl Frytag reported that by January 1943 only 120 Ju 87s could be produced at Bremen and 230 at Berlin-Tempelhof.

After evaluating Ju 87 operations on the Eastern Front Hermann Göring ordered production limited to 200 per month in total. General der Schlachtflieger (General of Close-Support Aviation) Ernst Kupfer decided continued development would "hardly bring any further tactical value". Adolf Galland, a fighter pilot with operational and combat experience in strike aircraft, said to abandon development would be premature, but 150 machines per month would be sufficient.

On 28 July 1943, strike and bomber production was to be scaled down, and fighter and bomber destroyer production given precedence. On 3 August 1943, Milch contradicted this and declared that this increase in fighter production would not affect production of the Ju 87, Ju 188, Ju 288 and Ju 290. This was an important consideration as the life expectancy of a Ju 87 had been reduced (since 1941) from 9.5 months to 5.5 months, to just some 100 operational flying hours. On 26 October, General der Schlachtflieger Ernst Kupfer reported the Ju 87 could no longer survive in operations and that the Focke-Wulf Fw 190F should take its place. Milch finally agreed and ordered the minimal continuance of Ju 87 D-3 and D-5 production for a smooth transition period. In May 1944, production wound down. 78 Ju 87s were built in May and 69 rebuilt from damaged machines. In the next six months 438 Ju 87 Ds and Gs were added to the Ju 87 force as new or repaired aircraft. It is unknown whether any Ju 87s were built from parts unofficially after December 1944 and the end of production.

Overall some 550 Ju 87 As and B2s were completed at the Junkers factory in Dessau. Production of the Ju 87 R and D variants were passed to the Weserflug company, which was to produce 5,930 of the 6,500 Ju 87s produced in total. During the course of the war little damage was done to the WFG plant at Bremen. Attacks throughout 1940-45 caused little lasting damage and succeeded only damaging some Ju 87 airframes, which was in "contrast" to the Focke-Wulf plant in Bremen. At Berlin-Templehof little delay and damage was caused to Ju 87 production, despite the heavy bombings and large-scale destruction inflicted on other targets. The WFG was again unscathed. The Junkers factory at Dessau was heavily attacked, but not until Ju 87 production had ceased. The Ju 87 repair facility at the Wels aircraft works was destroyed on 30 May 1944, and the site abandoned Ju 87 links.

Ju 87 G-2s over the Eastern Front, winter 1943-44.

Among the many German aircraft designs that participated in the Legion Condor and Spanish Civil War, a single Ju 87 A-0 (the V4 prototype) was allocated serial number 29-1 and was assigned to the VJ/88, the experimental Staffel of the Legion's fighter wing. The aircraft was secretly loaded onto the Spanish ship Usaramo and departed Hamburg harbor on the night of 1 August 1936, arriving in Cadiz five days later.

The only known information pertaining to its combat career in Spain is that it was piloted by Unteroffizier Herman Beuer, and took part in the Nationalist offensive against Bilbao in 1937. Presumably the aircraft was then secretly returned to Germany.

In January 1938 three Ju 87 As arrived. Several problems became evident - the spatted undercarriage sank into muddy airfield surfaces, and the spats were temporarily removed. In addition, the maximum 500 kg (1,100 lb) bomb load could only be carried if the gunner vacated his seat, and the bomb load was therefore restricted to 250 kg (550 lb). These aircraft supported the Nationalist forces and carried out anti-shipping missions until they returned to Germany in October 1938.

The A-1s were replaced by five Ju 87 B-1s. With the war coming to an end they found little to do and were used to support Heinkel He 111s attacking Republican positions. As the Ju 87 A-0 had been, the B-1s were returned discreetly to the Reich.

The experience of the Spanish Civil War had been invaluable - air and ground crews perfected their skills, and equipment was evaluated under combat conditions. Although no Ju 87s had been lost in Spain, however, the Ju 87 had not been tested against numerous and well-coordinated fighter opposition, and this lesson was to be learned later at great cost to the Stuka crews.

All Stuka units were moved to Germany's eastern border in preparation for the invasion of Poland. On the morning of August 15, 1939, during a mass formation dive bombing demonstration for high ranking commanders of the Luftwaffe at Neuhammer training grounds near Sagan, 13 Ju-87 with 26 crew members were lost when they crashed into the ground almost simultaneously. The planes dived through cloud, expecting to release their practice bombs and pull out of the dive once below the cloud ceiling, unaware that on that particular day the ceiling was too low and unexpected ground mist formed, leaving them no time to pull out of the dive.

On 1 September 1939, the Wehrmacht invaded Poland triggering World War II . Generalquartiermeister der Luftwaffe records indicate a total force of 366 Ju 87 A and Bs were available for operations on the 31 August 1939. At exactly 0426, a Kette ("chain" or flight of three) of Ju 87s of 3./StG 1 led by Staffelkapitän Oberleutnant Bruno Dilly carried out the first bombing attack of the war. The aim was to destroy the Polish demolition charges wired to the Dirschau bridges over the Vistula River. The Stukas attacked just 11 minutes before the official German declaration of hostilities and hit the targets. However, the mission failed and the Poles destroyed the bridge before the Germans could reach it.

A Ju 87 achieved the first air victory during World War II on 1 September 1939 in the morning, when Rottenführer Leutnant Frank Neubert of I./StG 2 "Immelmann" shot down a Polish PZL P.11c fighter, while it was taking off from Balice airfield, piloted by Captain Mieczysław Medwecki, who was killed in the engagement. The Luftwaffe had a few anti-shipping naval units such as 4.(St)/TrGr 186. This unit performed effectively, sinking the 1540-ton destroyer ORP Wicher and minelayer ORP Gryf of the Polish Navy (both moored in a harbour).

On one occasion six Polish divisions trapped by encircling German forces were forced to surrender after a relentless four-day bombardment by StG 51, 76 and 77. Employed in this assault were the 50 kg (110 lb) fragmentation bombs which caused appalling casualties to the Polish ground troops. Demoralized, the Poles surrendered. The Stukas also participated in the Battle of Bzura which resulted in the breaking of Polish resistance. The Sturzkampfgeschwader alone dropped 388 tonnes (428 tons) of bombs during this battle.

Once again, enemy air opposition was light, the Stukawaffe (Stuka force) losing just 31 aircraft during the campaign.

Operation Weserübung began on 9 April 1940 with the invasions of Norway and Denmark, Denmark capitulated within the day whilst Norway continued to resist with British and French help.

The campaign was not the classic "Blitzkrieg" of fast-moving armoured divisions supported by air-power as the mountainous terrain ruled out close Panzer/Stuka cooperation. Instead the Germans relied on Fallschirmjäger (paratroops), airborne troops transported by Junkers Ju 52s and specialised ski troops. The strategic nature of the operation made the Stuka essential. The Ju 87s were given the role of ground attack and anti-shipping missions. The Stuka was to prove the most effective weapon in the Luftwaffe's armoury carrying out the latter.

On 9 April, the first Stukas took off at 10.59 hours from occupied airfields to destroy Oscarsborg Fortress, after the loss of the German cruiser Blücher which caused disruption of the amphibious landings in Oslo through Oslofjord. The 22 Ju 87s had helped suppress the Norwegian defenders during the ensuing Battle of Drøbak Sound but the defenders did not surrender until after Oslo had been captured. As a result, the German naval operation failed. StG 1 caught the 735 ton Norwegian destroyer Æger off Stavanger and hit her in the engine room. Æger was run aground and scuttled. The Stukageschwader were now equipped with the new Ju 87 R, which differed from the Ju 87 B by having increased internal fuel capacity and two 300l underwing drop tanks for more range.

The Stukas, however, had numerous successes against Allied naval vessels. HMS Bittern was sunk on 30 April. The French large destroyer Bison was sunk along with HMS Afridi by Sturzkampfgeschwader 1 on 3 May 1940 during the evacuation from Namsos. Bison's forward magazine was hit, killing 108 of the crew. Afridi, which attempted to rescue Bison's survivors, was sunk with the loss of 63 sailors.

The Stukawaffe had learned some lessons from the Polish and Norwegian campaigns. The failures of Poland and the Stukas of I.StG 1 to silence the Oscarborg fort ensured even more attention was paid to pin-point bombing during the Phoney War period. This was to pay off in the Western campaign. When Fall Gelb began on 10 May 1940, the Stuka helped swiftly neutralise the fortress of Eben Emael. The HQ of the Commander responsible for ordering the destruction of the bridges along the Albert Canal was stationed in the village of Lanaeken (14 km/ mi to the north). However the Stuka demonstrated its accuracy when the small building was destroyed after receiving four direct hits. As a result only one of the three bridges was destroyed allowing the German Army to rapidly advance.

The Sturzkampfgeschwader were also instrumental in achieving the breakthrough at the Battle of Sedan. The Stukawaffe flew 300 sorties against French positions, with StG 77 alone flying 201 individual missions. When resistance was organised, the Ju 87s were vulnerable. For example, on 12 May, near Sedan, six French Curtiss H-75s from Groupe de Chasse I/5 attacked a formation of Ju 87s shooting down 11 out of 12 unescorted Ju 87s without loss to themselves.

The Luftwaffe also benefited from excellent ground-to-air communications throughout the campaign. Radio equipped forward liaison officers could call upon the Stukas and direct them to attack enemy positions along the axis of advance. In some cases the Stukas responded to requests in 10–20 minutes. Oberstleutnant Hans Seidemann (Richthofen's Chief of Staff) said that "never again was such a smoothly functioning system for discussing and planning joint operations achieved".

During the Battle of Dunkirk many Allied ships were lost to Ju 87 attacks. The French destroyer L' Adroit had already been sunk on 21 May. The paddle steamer Crested Eagle was sunk on 28 May 1940. The British destroyer HMS Grenade was sunk on 29 May and several other vessels damaged by Stuka attack. On 29 May, the Allies had lost 31 vessels sunk and 11 damaged. In total, 89 merchantmen (of 126,518 grt) were lost, and the Royal Navy lost 29 of its 40 destroyers (8 sunk, 23 damaged and out of service). Allied air power was ineffective and disorganised, and as a result the Stuka losses were mainly due to ground fire. Some 120 machines, one-third of the Stuka force, were destroyed or damaged to all causes.

For the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe's Order of battle consisted of five Geschwader equipped with the Ju 87. Lehrgeschwader 2's IV.(St), Sturzkampfgeschwader 1's III. Gruppe and Sturzkampfgeschwader 2's III. Gruppe, Sturzkampfgeschwader 51 and Sturzkampfgeschwader 3's I. Gruppe were committed to the battle. As an anti-shipping weapon the Ju 87 proved a potent weapon in the early stages. On 4 July 1940, StG 2 made a successful attack on a convoy in the English Channel, sinking four freighters, the Britsum, the Dallas City, the Deucalion and Kolga. Six more were damaged. That afternoon 33 Ju 87s delivered the single most deadly air assault on British territory in history, when 33 Ju 87s of III./StG 51, avoiding Royal Air Force (RAF) interception, sank the 5,500 ton anti-aircraft ship HMS Foylebank in Portland Harbour, killing 176 of its 298-strong crew. One of Foylebank's gunners, Leading Seaman John F. Mantle continued to fire on the Stukas as the ship sank. He was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for remaining at his post despite being mortally wounded. Mantle may have been responsible for the single Ju 87 lost during the raid.

During August, the Ju 87s also had some success. On 13 August the opening of the main German attacks on airfields took place. It was known to the Luftwaffe as Adlertag (Eagle Day) Messerschmitt Bf 109s of Jagdgeschwader 26 were sent out in advance of the main strike and successfully drew off RAF fighters, allowing 86 Ju 87s of StG 1 to attack RAF Detling unhindered. The attack killed the station commander, destroyed 20 RAF aircraft on the ground and a great many of the airfield's many buildings. However, Detling was not an RAF Fighter Command station.

The Battle of Britain proved for the first time that the Junkers Ju 87 was vulnerable in hostile skies against well-organised and determined fighter opposition. The Ju 87, like other dive bombers, was slow and possessed inadequate defences. Furthermore, it could not be effectively protected by fighters because of its low speed, and the very low altitudes at which it ended its dive bomb attacks. The Stuka depended on air superiority, the very thing being contested over Britain. It was withdrawn from attacks on Britain in August after prohibitive losses, leaving the Luftwaffe without precision ground-attack aircraft.

Steady losses had occurred throughout their participation in the battle. On 18 August, a day known as the "hardest day" as both sides suffered heavy losses, the Stuka was withdrawn after 16 were destroyed and many others damaged. According to the Generalquartiermeister der Luftwaffe, 59 Stukas were destroyed and 33 damaged, to varying degrees, in six weeks of operations. Over 20% of the total Stuka strength had been lost between 8 August and 18 August; with the myth of the Stuka shattered. The Ju 87s did succeed in sinking six warships, 14 merchant ships, badly damaging seven airfields and three radar stations, and destroying 49 British aircraft, mainly on the ground.

On 19 August the units of VIII. Fliegerkorps moved up from their bases around Cherbourg-Octeville and concentrated in the Pas de Calais under Luftflotte 2, closer to the area of the proposed invasion of Britain. On 13 September, the Luftwaffe targeted airfields again, with a small number of Ju 87s crossing the coast at Selsey and heading for Tangmere. After a lull, anti-shipping operations attacks were resumed by some Ju 87 units from 1 November 1940, as part of the new winter tactic of enforcing a blockade. Over the next 10 days, seven merchant ships were sunk or damaged, mainly in the Thames Estuary, for the loss of four Ju 87s. On 14 November, 19 Stukas from III./St.G 1 with escort drawn from JG 26 and JG 51 went out against another convoy; as no targets were found over the estuary, the Stukas proceeded to attack Dover, their alternate target.

Bad weather resulted in a decline of anti-shipping operations, and before long the Ju 87 Gruppen began re-deploying to the soon-to-be Eastern Front, as part of the concealed build-up for Operation Barbarossa. By spring 1941, only St.G 1 with 30 Ju 87s remained facing the United Kingdom. Operations on a small scale continued throughout the winter months into March. Targets included ships at sea, the Thames Estuary, the Chatham naval dockyard and Dover and night-bomber sorties made over the Channel. These attacks were resumed in the following winter.

In response to the Italian defeats in Greece and North Africa the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht ordered the deployment of some German forces to these theatres. Amongst the Luftwaffe contingent deployed was the Geschwaderstab StG 3 which touched down in Sicily in December 1940. In the next few days, two Gruppen- some 80 Stukas - were deployed under X. Fliegerkorps.

The first task of the Korps was to attack British shipping passing between Sicily and Africa. The Ju 87s first made their presence felt by subjecting the British aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious to heavy attack. The crews were confident that they could sink it as the flight deck had an area of about 6,500 square metres. On 10 January 1941, the Stuka crews were told that four direct hits with 500 kg (1,100 lb) bombs would be enough to sink the carrier. The Ju 87s delivered six and three damaging near-misses, but the ship's engines remained untouched and she made for the besieged harbour of Malta.

The Italian Regia Aeronautica was equipped for a while with the Stukas. In 1939, Italian government asked the RLM to supply 100 Ju 87s. Italian pilots were sent to Graz in Austria, to be trained for dive-bombing aircraft. In the summer, 1940 about 100 Ju 87 B-1s, some of them ex-Luftwaffe machines, were handed over to their Italian ally, and delivered to 96° Gruppo Bombardamento a Tuffo. The Italian Stuka, re-named Picchiatello, was in turn assigned to Gruppi 97°, 101° and 102°. The "Picchiatelli" were used against Malta and Allied convoys in Mediterranean, in North Africa (where they took part in conquering Tobruk). They were used by Regia Aeronautica up to 1942. Some of the Picchiatelli saw action in the opening phase of the Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940. The numbers were low and ineffective. The Italian forces were quickly pushed back. By early 1941, the Greeks had pushed into Italian occupied Albania. Once again Hitler decided to send military aid to his allies.

In March, the pro-German Yugoslav government was toppled. A furious Hitler ordered the attack to be expanded to include Yugoslavia. Operation Marita commenced on 7 April. The Luftwaffe committed StG 1, 2 and 77 to the campaign. The Stuka once again spearheaded the air assault with a front line strength of 300 machines, against minimal Yugoslav resistance in the air, giving the Stukas a fearsome reputation in this region. Operating unmolested they took a heavy toll of ground forces, suffering only light losses to ground fire. The effectiveness of the dive-bombers helped bring about Yugoslav capitulation in just ten days. The Stukas also took a peripheral part in Operation Punishment - Hitler's retribution bombing of Belgrade. The dive-bombers were to attack airfields and known anti-aircraft gun positions whilst the level bombers struck civilian targets. Belgrade was badly damaged, and 2,271 people were reported killed and 12,000 injured.

In Greece, despite British aid, little air opposition was encountered. As the Allies withdrew and resistance collapsed, the Allies began evacuating to Crete. The Stukas proved effective in inflicting severe damage on Allied shipping. On 22 April, the 1,389 ton destroyers Psara and Ydra were sunk. In the next two days, the Greek Naval base at Piraeus lost 23 vessels to Stuka attack.

During the Battle of Crete the Ju 87s also played a significant role. On 21–22 May 1941, the Germans attempted to send in reinforcements to Crete by sea, but lost 10 vessels to "Force D" under the command of Rear-Admiral Glennie. The force consisting of the cruisers HMS Dido, Orion and Ajax forced the remaining German ships to retreat. The Stukas were called upon to deal with the British Naval threat. On 21 May, the destroyer HMS Juno was sunk, and the next day, the battleship HMS Warspite was damaged and the cruiser HMS Gloucester was sunk with the loss of 45 officers and 648 ratings. The Ju 87s also crippled the cruiser HMS Fiji that morning, (she was later finished off by Bf 109 fighter bombers) while sinking the destroyer HMS Greyhound with a single hit. As the Battle of Crete drew to a close the Allies began yet another withdrawal. On 23 May the Royal Navy also lost the destroyers HMS Kashmir and Kelly sunk followed by HMS Hereward on 26 May; Orion and Dido were also severely damaged. Orion had been evacuating 1,100 soldiers to North Africa and lost 260 of them killed and another 280 wounded during the attacks.

The Sturzkampfgeschwader faithfully supported Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel's Deutsches Afrikakorps in its two year campaign in North Africa, helping it achieve considerable success. However, as the tide turned and Allied air power grew in the autumn of 1942, the Ju 87 became very vulnerable, and losses were heavy. The entry of the Americans into North Africa during Operation Torch made the situation far worse: the Stuka was obsolete in what was now a fighter-bomber's war. The Bf 109 and Fw 190 could at least fight on equal terms after dropping their ordnance , but the Stuka could not. The Junkers' vulnerability was demonstrated on 11 November 1942 when 15 Ju 87 Ds were all shot down by United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) Curtiss P-40Fs in minutes.

By 1943, the Allies enjoyed total air superiority in North Africa. The Ju 87s ventured out in Rotte strength only, often jettisoning their bombs at the first sight of enemy aircraft. Adding to this trouble the German fighters had only enough fuel to cover the Ju 87s at their most vulnerable; on take off. After that the Stukas were on their own.

The dive bombers continued to support operations in Southern Europe; after the Italian surrender in September 1943, the Ju 87 helped Germany achieve the last campaign-sized victory over the Western Allies, the Dodecanese Campaign. The Greek Dodecanese Islands had been occupied by the British; the Luftwaffe reacted by committing 75 Stukas (of StG 3 with bases in Megara and Rhodos) to recover the islands. With the RAF bases some 500 kilometres (310 mi) away, the Ju 87 helped the German landing forces to achieve a rapid conquest of the Islands.

On 22 June 1941, the Wehrmacht commenced Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. The Luftwaffe order of battle of 22 June 1941 contained four different Sturzkampfgeschwader. VIII. Fliegerkorps under the command of General der Flieger Wolfram von Richthofen was equipped with units Stab, II., and III./StG 1. Also included were Stab, I., II., and III. of Sturzkampfgeschwader 2 Immelmann. Attached to II. Fliegerkorps, under the Command of General der Flieger Bruno Loerzer, were Stab, I., II., and III. of StG 77. Luftflotte 5, under the command of Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff, operating from Norway's Arctic Circle, were allotted IV. Gruppe (St)/Lehrgeschwader 1 (LG 1).

The first Stuka loss on the Soviet-German front occurred early at 03:40–03:47 in the morning of the 22 June. While being escorted by Bf 109s from JG 51 to attack a fortress at Brest, Oberleutnant Karl Führing of StG 77 was shot down by a I-153. The Sturzkampfgeschwader had suffered only two losses on the opening day of Barbarossa. As a result of the Luftwaffe's attention, the Soviet Air Force in the Western Soviet Union was nearly destroyed. The official report claimed 1,489 Soviet aircraft destroyed. Göring ordered this checked. After picking their way through the wreckages across the front, Luftwaffe officers found that the tally exceeded 2,000. In the following two days the Soviets reported the loss of another 1,922 aircraft. Soviet aerial resistance, whilst it continued, ceased to be effective, and the Luftwaffe maintained air superiority until the end of the year.

The Ju 87 took a huge toll on Soviet ground forces, helping to break up counterattacks of Soviet armour, eliminating strong points, and disrupting the enemy supply lines. An example of the Stuka's effectiveness occurred on 5 July when StG 77 knocked out 18 trains and 500 vehicles. As Panzergruppe 1 and 2 forged bridgeheads across the Dnieper river and closed in on Kiev the Ju 87s again rendered invaluable support. On 13 September Stukas from StG 1 destroyed all the rail networks in the vicinity as well as inflicting heavy casualties on escaping Red Army columns, for the loss of a single Ju 87. Days later, on 23 September, Hans-Ulrich Rudel (who was to become the most decorated serviceman in the Wehrmacht) of StG 2, sank the Soviet battleship Marat, during an air attack on Kronstadt harbor in the Leningrad area, with a hit to the bow with a 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) bomb.

Also during this action Leutnant Egbert Jaeckel sank the destroyer Minsk, while the destroyer Steregushchiy and submarine M-74 were also sunk. The Stukas also crippled the battleship Oktyabrskaya Revolutsiya and the destroyers Silnyy and Grozyashchiy in exchange for two Ju 87s shot down.

Elsewhere on the Eastern front the Junkers assisted Army Group Centre in its drive toward Moscow. From 13–22 December, 420 vehicles and 23 tanks were destroyed by StG 77, greatly improving the morale of the German infantry, who were by now on the defensive. StG 77 finished the campaign as the most effective Sturzkampfgeschwader. It had destroyed 2,401 vehicles, 234 tanks, 92 artillery batteries and 21 trains for the loss of 25 Ju 87s to hostile action.

At the end of Barbarossa, StG 1 had lost 60 Stukas in aerial combat and one on the ground. StG 2 lost 39 Ju 87s in the air and two on the ground, StG 77 lost 29 of their dive-bombers in the air and three on the ground (25 to enemy action). IV.(St)/LG1 operating from Norway lost 24 Ju 87s, all in aerial combat.

In early 1942, the Ju 87s were to give the Germany Army (Heer) yet more valuable support. On 29 December 1941 the Soviet 44th Army landed on the Kerch Peninsula. The Luftwaffe was only able to dispatch meager reinforcements of four Kampfgruppen (Bomber Group. Note: not Kampfgeschwader, meaning Bomber Wing) and two Sturzkampfgruppen, (Dive Bomber Groups) belonging to StG 77. With air-superiority, the Ju 87s operated with impunity. In the first 10 days, ½ the landing force was destroyed, while sea supply lines were cut off by the Stukas inflicting heavy losses on Soviet shipping. The Ju 87s effectiveness against Soviet armour was not yet potent. Later versions of the T-34 tank could withstand Stuka attack, in general, unless a direct hit was scored, but the Soviet 44th Army had only obsolescent types with thin armour which were nearly all destroyed.

During the Battle of Sevastopol the Stukas mercilessly bombed the trapped Soviet forces. Some Ju 87 pilots flew up to 300 sorties against the Soviet defenders. Luftflotte 4's StG 77 flew 7,708 combat sorties dropping 3,537 tonnes of bombs on the city. Their efforts help secure the capitulation of Soviet forces on 4 July.

For the German summer offensive, Fall Blau, the Luftwaffe had concentrated 1,800 aircraft into Luftflotte 4 making it the largest and most powerful single air-command in the world. The Stukawaffe strength stood at 151. During the Battle of Stalingrad Stukas flew thousands of sorties against Soviet positions in the city. StG 1, 2 and 77 flew 320 individual sorties on 14 October 1942. As the German Sixth Army pushed the Soviets into a 1,000 metre enclave on the West bank of the Volga river, 1,208 Stuka sorties were flown against this small strip of land. However, the intense air attack, though causing horrific losses on Soviet units, failed to destroy them. The Luftwaffe's Sturzkampfgeschwader made maximum effort during this phase of the war. They flew an average of 500 sorties per day and caused heavy losses among Soviet forces, losing an average of only one Stuka per day.

The Battle of Stalingrad marked the high point in the fortunes of the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka. As the strength of the Soviet Air Forces grew, they gradually wrestled control of the skies from the Luftwaffe. From this point onward the vulnerability of the Stuka to fighter attack caused losses to increase.

The Stuka was also heavily involved in Operation Citadel, the Battle of Kursk. The Luftwaffe committed I, II, III./St.G 1 and III./StG 3 under the command of Luftflotte 6. I., II, III. of StGs 2 and 3 were committed under the command of Hans Seidemann's Fliegerkorps VIII. Hauptmann Rudel's cannon-equipped Ju 87 Gs had a devastating effect on Soviet armour at Orel and Belgorod. The Ju 87s participated in a huge aerial counter-offensive lasting from 16 July–31 July against a Soviet offensive at Khotynets and saved two German armies from encirclement, reducing the attacking Soviet 11th Guard Army to just 33 tanks by 20 July. The Soviet offensive had been completely halted from the air.

However losses were considerable. Fliegerkorps VIII lost eight Ju 87s on 8 July, six on 9 July, six on 10 July and another eight on 11 July. The Stuka arm also lost eight of their Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross holders. StG 77 lost 24 Ju 87s in the period 5–31 July (StG had lost 23 in July–December 1942) while StG 2 lost another 30 aircraft in the same period. In September 1943, three of the Stuka units were re-equipped with the Fw 190 Schlachtgeschwader. In the face of overwhelming air opposition, the dive-bomber required heavy protection from German fighters to counter the Soviet fighters. Some units like StG 2 Immelmann continued to operate with great success throughout 1943-45 operating the Ju 87 G variants equipped with 37 mm cannons, which became effective tank killers, although in increasingly small numbers.

In the wake of the defeat at Kursk, Ju 87s played a vital defensive role on the southern wing of the Eastern Front. To combat the Luftwaffe, the Soviets could deploy some 3,000 fighter aircraft, as a result the Stukas suffered heavily. StG 77 lost 30 Ju 87s in August 1943 as did StG 2 Immelmann, who also reported the loss of 30 aircraft in combat operations. Despite these losses, Ju 87s helped the 29. Armeekorps break out of an encirclement near the Sea of Azov. The Battle of Kiev also included substantial use of the Ju 87 units, although again, unsuccessful in stemming the advances. The Stuka units were now, with the loss of air superiority, becoming vulnerable on the ground as well. Some Luftwaffe Stuka aces were lost this way. In the aftermath of Kursk, Stuka strength had fallen to 184 aircraft in total. This was well below the 50 percent of required strength. On 18 October 1943, StG 1, 2, 3, 5 and 77 were redesignated as Schlachtgeschwader wings, reflecting their repurposed ground-attack role, as these combat wings were now also using more generalized ground-attack aircraft, such as the Fw 190F-series aircraft. The Luftwaffe's individual dive-bomber units had ceased to exist.

Towards the end of the war, as overhelming air superiority was gained by the Allies, the Stuka was being replaced by ground-attack versions of the Fw 190. By early 1944, the number of Ju 87 units and operational aircraft entered into terminal decline. As the Soviet summer offensive, Operation Bagration got underway, 12 Ju 87 Gruppen and five mixed Gruppen (including Fw 190s) were on the Luftwaffe's order of battle on 26 June 1944. Gefechtsverband Kuhlmey, a mixed aircraft unit, which included large numbers of Stuka dive bombers, was rushed to the Finnish front in the summer of 1944, and was instrumental in halting the Soviet fourth strategic offensive. The unit claimed 200 Soviet tanks and 150 Soviet aircraft destroyed for 41 losses. By this juncture, the Luftwaffe continued to resist Soviet air attacks but it had little impact on the ground war.

By 31 January 1945, only 104 Ju 87s remained operational with their units. The other mixed Schlacht units contained a further 70 Ju 87s and Fw 190s between them. Chronic fuel shortages were now keeping the Stukas grounded and sorties decreased until the end of the war in May 1945.

Friday, April 8, 2011

The 7ET9 and 7ET10 submachine gun by TASCO of the Ukraine



The 7ET9 submachine gun is in development by the state-owned TASCO corporation of Ukraine. Apparently it is based on the unsuccessful prototype Elf-2 submachine gun, developed during mid-1990s by questionable and now-defunct KB-ST organization. Unlike the prototype, the 7ET9 returned to simple design and more or less realistic characteristics. It is fairy typical submachine gun of conventional design; originally developed for more or less obsolete 7.62x25 TT cartridge, it was also developed into 9x19 version, known as 7ET10. According to available information both versions are still not completely developed and neither is being manufactured so far. Very little proven and factual information is available on this design, so description below may have some speculations and assumptions rather than facts.

TASCO 7ET10 submachine gun, caliber 9x19.

The 7ET9 is a simple blowback weapon. It uses stamped steel receiver and fires from open bolt. Charging handle is made in the form of dual sliders located at either side of receiver. Magazine is inserted into pistol grip. Submachine gun is fitted with top-folding shoulder stock and folding front grip, which can be dismounted and replaced by forend with integral tactical light or laser pointer. Special silencer could be attached to the barrel. All accessories for 7ET9 are made by the TASCO corporation.

Caliber: 7.62x25 TT (7ET9) or 9x19mm Luger/Para (7ET10)
Weight: 2.5 kg less magazine
Length (stock closed/open): 360 / 550 mm
Barrel length: 200 mm
Rate of fire: 600 (7ET9) or 900 (7ET10) rounds per minute
Magazine capacity: 30 rounds
Effective range: 100-150 meters

Thursday, April 7, 2011

Design Bureau for Special Techniques of Ukraine's Elf-2 submachine gun


The Elf-2 submachine gun has been developed by one of the most controversial arms design facilities, the infamous KB-ST (Design Bureau for Special Techniques) of Ukraine. This bureau actively worked during mid- to late 1990s in attempts to produce new and perspective small arms of inexpensive price but theoretically outstanding combat characteristics. Despite much hype and praise in local Ukrainian press no Russian or Western expert were ever allowed to test these "wunderwaffe" seriously, and no production versions ever appeared. Taking into account the fact that KB-ST organization finally folded in about 2002, we may assume that these weapons were actually something else,representing a handful of roughly made prototypes of questionable usefulness.

 Elf-2 submachine gun, prototype.

 Elf-2 submachine gun was intended to compete with designs like IMI Uzi or Steyr MPi-69. It had similar layout with magazine inserted into pistol grip and telescoped bolt. However, the bolt was made from two linked parts to provide slower (and more controllable) rate of fire of about 450 rounds per minute. Another very unusual feature was the forced air cooling system of the barrel - front part of the moving bolt acted like air pump, pushing the air through the barrel jacket. In theory, this was necessary to provide sustained fire capability, but the real usefulness of such feature in submachine gun is really questionable. Actual design of the two-part retarded blowback breech block system was not disclosed, but this system was claimed to provide minimal recoil and vibrations. Elf-2 fired from open bolt with advanced primer ignition. Other features included folding front grip (which also served as a spare magazine holder) and retractable buttstock made from wire and stamped steel.

Caliber: 9x18 PM
Weight: 2.5 kg less magazine
Length (stock closed/open): 416 / 580 mm
Barrel length: 240 mm
Rate of fire: 450 rounds per minute
Magazine capacity: 25 or 32 rounds
Effective range: 100-150 meters

Wednesday, April 6, 2011

Battle of Stalingrad: Order of Battle



The Battle of Stalingrad was a major battle of World War II in which Nazi Germany and its allies fought the Soviet Union for control of the city of Stalingrad (now Volgograd) in southwestern Russia. The battle took place between 23 August 1942 and 2 February 1943 and was among the largest on the Eastern Front, and was marked by its brutality and disregard for military and civilian casualties. It was amongst the bloodiest battles in the history of warfare with the higher estimates of combined casualties amounting to nearly two million deaths. In the defeat, the crippling losses suffered by Germany's military proved to be insurmountable for the war. The battle was a turning point in the war, making a German victory in the East impossible.

Soviet soldier waving the Red Banner over the central plaza of Stalingrad in 1943.

The German offensive to capture Stalingrad commenced in late summer 1942, supported by intensive Luftwaffe bombing which reduced much of the city to rubble. The German offensive eventually bogged down in house-to-house fighting and despite controlling over 90% of the city at times, the Wehrmacht was unable to dislodge the last Soviet defenders clinging tenaciously to the west bank of the Volga River.

In November 1942, the Red Army launched Operation Uranus; a two-pronged attack specifically targeted at the inferior Romanian and Italian forces protecting the German 6th Army flanks. The success of these attacks caused the weakly held flanks to collapse and the 6th Army to be cut off and surrounded inside Stalingrad. As the Russian winter set in, the 6th Army weakened rapidly from cold, starvation and ongoing Soviet attacks. Command ambiguity coupled with Adolf Hitler's resolute belief in the "power of the will" and the value of "standing fast" further compounded the German predicament. Eventually, the failure to break the encirclement by relieving German forces, coupled with the failure of re-supply by air, caused the final collapse. By early February 1943, German resistance in Stalingrad had ceased and the remaining elements of the surrounded 6th Army had either surrendered or had been destroyed.

Background


By spring 1942, the Germans had stabilized their new front in a line running roughly from Leningrad in the north to Rostov in the south. There were a number of salients in the line where Soviet offensives had pushed the Germans back, notably to the northwest of Moscow and south of Kharkov, but neither was particularly threatening. In the far south, the Germans were in control of most of Ukraine and much of the Crimea, although Sevastopol remained in Soviet hands along with a small portion of the Kerch Peninsula.

The Germans were confident they could master the Red Army after the winter of 1941. There was some substance to this belief: while the German Army Group Centre (Heeresgruppe Mitte) had suffered heavy punishment, 65% of its infantry had not been engaged during the winter fighting, and had been rested and reequipped; and Army Groups North and South had not been particularly hard pressed over the winter.

Importance of Stalingrad

The capture of Stalingrad was important to Adolf Hitler, and Benito Mussolini, for two primary reasons. First, the city was an important base on the transportation route provided by the Volga River between the Caspian Sea and northern Russia. Consequently a German capture of the city would effectively sever the Soviet river link to the north. Second, its capture would secure the western flank of the German armies as they advanced into the oil-rich city of Baku—with the strategic aim of cutting off fuel from Stalin's war machine. The fact that the city bore the name of the leader of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin, would make its capture an ideological and propaganda coup.

The Soviets realized that they were under tremendous constraints of time and resources and ordered that anyone strong enough to hold a rifle be sent to defend the city. At this stage of the war, the Red Army was less capable of highly mobile operations than the German Army. However, combat in large urban areas tends to be dominated by small arms weaponry rather than armored and mechanized units. This would lessen any Soviet disadvantage because the Red Army was specially trained for close-quarters urban combat, whereas the Wehrmacht was principally trained for fast moving open-field operations.

Army Group South was selected for a sprint forward through the southern Russian steppes into the Caucasus to capture the vital Soviet oil fields there. The planned summer offensive was code-named Fall Blau ("Case Blue"). It was to include the German 6th, 17th, 4th Panzer and 1st Panzer Armies. Army Group South had overrun the Ukrainian SSR in 1941. Poised in Eastern Ukraine, it was to spearhead the offensive.

Hitler intervened, however, ordering the Army Group to be split in two. Army Group South (A), under the command of Wilhelm List, was to continue advancing south towards the Caucasus as planned with the 17th Army and First Panzer Army. Army Group South (B), including Friedrich Paulus’ 6th Army and Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, was to move east towards the Volga and Stalingrad. Army Group B was commanded initially by Field Marshal Fedor von Bock and later by General Maximilian von Weichs.

The start of Case Blau had been planned for late May 1942. However, a number of German and Romanian units that were involved in Blau were then in the process of besieging Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula. Delays in ending the siege pushed back the start date for Blau several times, and the city did not fall until the end of June. A smaller action was taken in the meantime, pinching off a Soviet salient in the Second Battle of Kharkov, which resulted in the pocketing of a large Soviet force on 22 May.


Blau finally opened as Army Group South began its attack into southern Russia on 28 June 1942. The German offensive started well. Soviet forces offered little resistance in the vast empty steppes and started streaming eastward. Several attempts to re-establish a defensive line failed when German units outflanked them. Two major pockets were formed and destroyed: the first, northeast of Kharkov, on 2 July, and a second, around Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, a week later. Meanwhile, the Hungarian 2nd Army and the German 4th Panzer Army had launched an assault on Voronezh, capturing the city on 5 July.

The initial advance of the 6th Army was so successful that Hitler intervened and ordered the 4th Panzer Army to join Army Group South (A) to the south. A massive traffic jam resulted when the 4th Panzer and the 6th both required the few roads in the area. Both armies were stopped dead while they attempted to clear the resulting mess of thousands of vehicles. The delay was long, and it is thought that it cost the advance at least one week. With the advance now slowed, Hitler changed his mind and re-assigned the 4th Panzer Army back to the attack on Stalingrad.


By the end of July, the Germans had pushed the Soviets across the Don River. At this point, the Don and Volga Rivers were only 40 mi (64 km) apart, and the Germans left their main supply depots west of the Don, which was to have important implications later in the course of the battle. The Germans began using the armies of their Italian, Hungarian, Croatian and Romanian allies to guard their left (northern) flank. The Italians are not often credited with bravery in the fighting, but they won several accolades in official German communiques. They were held in little regard by the Germans, and were often accused of cowardice and low morale: in reality, their ineffectiveness in combat was due to their very scarce equipment, obsolete weaponry, and primitive tactics of Italian officers, thus often being obliged to retreat or flee. They distinguished themselves in numerous battles, as in the battle of Nikolayevka. The German 6th Army was only a few dozen kilometers from Stalingrad, and 4th Panzer Army, now to their south, turned northwards to help take the city. To the south, Army Group A was pushing far into the Caucasus, but their advance slowed as supply lines grew overextended. The two German army groups were not positioned to support one another due to the great distances involved.

After German intentions became clear in July, Stalin appointed Marshal Andrey Yeryomenko as commander of the Southeastern Front on 1 August 1942. Yeryomenko and Commissar Nikita Khrushchev were tasked with planning the defense of Stalingrad. The eastern border of Stalingrad was the wide River Volga, and over the river, additional Soviet units were deployed. These units became the newly formed 62nd Army, which Yeryomenko placed under the command of Lt. Gen. Vasiliy Chuikov on 11 September 1942. The situation was extremely dire. When asked how he interpreted his task, he responded "We will defend the city or die in the attempt." The 62nd Army's mission was to defend Stalingrad at all costs. Chuikov's generalship during the battle earned him one of his two Hero of the Soviet Union awards.

Beginning of the battle

The Soviets had enough warning of the Germans' advance to ship virtually all the city's grain, cattle, and railroad rolling stock across the Volga and out of harm's way. This "harvest victory" left the city short of food even before the German attack began. Production continued in some factories, particularly the one producing T-34 tanks. Before the Wehrmacht reached the city itself, the Luftwaffe had rendered the River Volga, vital for bringing supplies into the city, unusable to Soviet shipping. Between 25 and 31 July, 32 Soviet ships were sunk, with another nine crippled.


Nazi generals present Hitler with a cake of Baku and the Caspian Sea.

The battle began with the heavy bombing of the city by Generaloberst Wolfram von Richthofen's Luftflotte 4, which in the summer and autumn of 1942 was the most powerful single air formation in the world. Some 1,000 tons of bombs were dropped. The city was quickly turned to rubble, although some factories continued production while workers joined in the fighting. The Croatian 369th Reinforced Infantry Regiment was the only non-German unit selected by the Wehrmacht to enter Stalingrad city during assault operations. It fought as part of the 100th jager division.

Stalin rushed all available troops to the east bank of the Volga, some from as far away as Siberia. All the regular ferries were quickly destroyed by the Luftwaffe, which then targeted troop barges being towed slowly across the river by tugs. Many civilians were evacuated across the Volga. It has been said that Stalin prevented civilians from leaving the city in the belief that their presence would encourage greater resistance from the city's defenders. Civilians, including women and children, were put to work building trenchworks and protective fortifications. A massive German air bombardment on 23 August caused a firestorm, killing thousands and turning Stalingrad into a vast landscape of rubble and burnt ruins. Ninety percent of the living space in the Voroshilovskiy area was destroyed. Between 23 and 26 August, Soviet reports indicate 955 people were killed and another 1,181 wounded as a result of the bombing. Casualties of 40,000 were exaggerated, and after 25 August, the Soviets did not record civilian and military casualties as a result of air raids.

Operation Blau: German advances from 7 May 1942 to 18 November 1942 (Double click to enlarge). 

The Soviet Air Force, the Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily (VVS), was swept aside by the Luftwaffe. The VVS assembly in the immediate area lost 201 aircraft between 23 and 31 August, and despite meager reinforcements of some 100 aircraft in August, it was left with just 192 serviceable aircraft, 57 of which were fighters. The Soviets continued to pour aerial reinforcements into the Stalingrad area in late September, but continued to suffer appalling losses; the Luftwaffe had complete control of the skies. However, due to the relocation of Soviet industry in 1941, Soviet aircraft production reached 15,800 in the second half of 1942. The VVS was able to preserve significant strength and build up a strategic reserve that would eventually overpower the Luftwaffe.

The burden of the initial defense of the city fell on the 1077th Anti-Aircraft Regiment, a unit made up mainly of young female volunteers who had no training for engaging ground targets. Despite this, and with no support available from other units, the AA gunners stayed at their posts and took on the advancing panzers. The German 16th Panzer Division reportedly had to fight the 1077th’s gunners "shot for shot" until all 37 anti-aircraft batteries were destroyed or overrun. The German 16th Panzer Division was shocked to find that, due to Soviet manpower shortages, it had been fighting female soldiers. In the beginning, the Soviets relied extensively on "Workers' militias" composed of workers not directly involved in war production. For a short time, tanks continued to be produced and then manned by volunteer crews of factory workers. They were driven directly from the factory floor to the front line, often without paint or even gunsights.


By the end of August, Army Group South (B) had finally reached the Volga, north of Stalingrad. Another advance to the river south of the city followed. By 1 September, the Soviets could only reinforce and supply their forces in Stalingrad by perilous crossings of the Volga under constant bombardment by artillery and aircraft.

The German advance to the Don River between 7 May and 23 July (Double click to enlarge).

On 5 September, the Soviet 24th and 66th Armies organized a massive attack against XIV Panzerkorps. The Luftwaffe helped repulse the offensive by heavily attacking Soviet artillery positions and defensive lines. The Soviets were forced to withdraw at midday after only a few hours. Of the 120 tanks the Soviets had committed, 30 were lost to air attack.

Soviet operations were constantly hampered by the Luftwaffe. On 18 September, the Soviet 1st Guards and 24th Army launched an offensive against VIII. Armeekorps at Kotluban. VIII. Fliegerkorps dispatched wave after wave of Stuka dive-bombers to prevent a breakthrough. The offensive was repulsed. The Stukas claimed 41 of the 106 Soviet tanks knocked out that morning, while escorting Bf 109s destroyed 77 Soviet aircraft. Amid the debris of the wrecked city, the Soviet 62nd and 64th Armies, which included the Soviet 13th Guards Rifle Division, anchored their defense lines with strongpoints in houses and factories.

Fighting within the ruined city was fierce and desperate. Lieutenant General Alexander Rodimtsev was in charge of the 13th Guards Rifle Division, and received one of two Heroes of the Soviet Union awarded during the battle for his actions. Stalin's Order No. 227 of 27 July 1942 decreed that all commanders who ordered unauthorized retreat would be subject to a military tribunal. “Not a step back!” and "There is no land behind the Volga!" were the slogans. The Germans pushing forward into Stalingrad suffered heavy casualties.

Hugging tactics


German military doctrine was based on the principle of combined-arms teams and close cooperation between tanks, infantry, engineers, artillery and ground-attack aircraft. To counter this, Soviet commanders adopted the tactic of always keeping the front lines as close to the Germans as physically possible; Chuikov called this "hugging" the Germans. This forced the German infantry to either fight on their own or risk taking casualties from their own supporting fire; it neutralized German close air support and weakened artillery support. The Soviets understood that, in Stalingrad, the best defense would depend on anchoring their defense lines in numerous buildings overseeing strategically important streets and squares. Such a strategy would hold for as long as possible all the ground the Soviets could take in the city. Thus, they converted multi-floored apartment blocks, factories, warehouses, street corner residences and office buildings into strongholds bristling with machine guns, anti-tank rifles, mortars, mines, barbed wire, snipers and small 5-10 man units of submachine gunners and grenadiers prepared for house-to-house combat. Bitter fighting raged for every ruin, street, factory, house, basement and staircase. The sewers were the sites of labyrinthine firefights. The Germans, calling this unseen urban warfare Rattenkrieg ("Rat War"), bitterly joked about capturing the kitchen but still fighting for the living room. In such desperate chaos, all battle lines vanished, and the major, armor-supported mobility to which the German soldiers were accustomed degenerated into vicious, fast-paced skirmishes ranging through bombed-out debris of residential neighborhoods, office blocks, basements and apartment high-rises. Some of the taller buildings, blasted into roofless shells by earlier German aerial bombardment, saw floor-by-floor, close-quarters combat, with the Germans and Soviets on alternate levels, firing at each other through holes in the floors.

Infantry and a supporting StuG III assault gun advance towards the city center.

Fighting on Mamayev Kurgan, a prominent hill above the city, was particularly merciless, and the position changed hands many times. By 12 September, the Soviet 62nd Army had been reduced to 90 tanks, 700 mortars and just 20,000 men.

The 13th Guards Rifle Division, assigned to retake Mamayev Kurgan and Railway Station No. 1 on 13 September suffered particularly heavy losses. Over 30 percent of its soldiers were killed in the first 24 hours, and just 320 out of the original 10,000 survived the entire battle. Both objectives were retaken, but only temporarily. The railway station changed hands 14 times in six hours. By the following evening, the 13th Guards Rifle Division had ceased to exist, but its men had killed approximately an equal number of Germans. Combat raged there for weeks near the giant grain silo. When German soldiers finally took the position, only forty dead Soviet fighters were found, though the Germans had thought there were many more due to the ferocious resistance. The Soviets burned heaps of grain during their retreat. In another part of the city, a Soviet platoon under the command of Yakov Pavlov turned an apartment building that oversaw a square in the city center into an impenetrable fortress, later called "Pavlov's House". The soldiers surrounded it with minefields, set up machine-gun positions at the windows and breached the walls in the basement for better communications. The soldiers found about ten Soviet civilians hiding in the basement. They were not relieved, and not significantly reinforced, for two months. Well after the battle, Chuikov liked to joke that more Germans died trying to capture Pavlov's House than died capturing Paris. According to Beevor, throughout the second month, after each wave of German assault against the building, the Soviets had to run out and kick down the piles of German corpses in order for the machine and anti-tank gunners in the building to have clear firing lines across the square. The building was labeled Festung ("Fortress") on German maps. Sgt. Pavlov was awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union for his actions.

German officer with a Russian PPSh 41 submachine gun taking cover in rubble.

With no end in sight, the Germans started transferring heavy artillery to the city, including the gigantic 800 mm (31.5 in) railroad gun nicknamed "Dora", but made no attempt to send a force across the Volga, allowing the Soviets to build up a large number of artillery batteries on the east side. This artillery continued to bombard the German positions. German tanks became useless amid heaps of rubble up to eight meters high.

The aftermath of a bombing raid in the city.

Snipers on both sides used the ruins to inflict heavy casualties. The most famous soviet sniper in Stalingrad was Vasily Zaytsev with 225 confirmed kills during the battle (there were four higher scoring snipers throughout the war: Ivan Sidorenko 500 kills, Fyodor Okhlopkov an ethnic Yakut with 429 kills, and two women; Lyudmila Pavlichenko with 309 kills and Nina Lobkovskaya with 308 kills). Zaytsev was one of a whole corps of snipers and had over 30 students, who were credited with killing over 3,000 German soldiers during the war.

Soviets preparing to ward off a German assault in Stalingrad's suburbs.

For both Stalin and Hitler, Stalingrad became a matter of prestige over and above its actual strategic significance. The Soviet command moved the Red Army's strategic reserves from the Moscow area to the lower Volga, and transferred aircraft from the entire country to the Stalingrad region.

Soviet soldiers in the Red October Factory.

The strain on both military commanders was immense: Paulus developed an uncontrollable tic in his eye, which eventually afflicted the left side of his face, while Chuikov experienced an outbreak of eczema that required him to have his hands completely bandaged. Troops on both sides faced the constant strain of close-range combat.

Determined to crush Soviet resistance, Luftflotte 4's Stukawaffe flew 900 individual sorties against Soviet positions at the Dzerzhinskiy Tractor Factory on 5 October. Several Soviet regiments were wiped out; the entire staff of the Soviet 339th Infantry Regiment were killed the following morning during an air raid.

The German advance to Stalingrad between 24 July and 18 November (Double click to enlarge).

In mid-October, the Luftwaffe intensified its efforts against remaining Red Army positions holding the west bank. Luftflotte 4 flew 2,000 sorties on 14 October and 600 short tons (540 t) of bombs were dropped while German infantry surrounded the three factories. Stukageschwader 1, 2, and 77 had largely silenced Soviet artillery on the eastern bank of the Volga before turning their attention to the shipping that was once again trying to reinforce the narrowing Soviet pockets of resistance. The 62nd Army had been cut in two, and, due to intensive air attack on its supply ferries, was now being paralyzed.

With the Soviets forced into a 1,000 yd (910 m) strip of land on the western bank of the Volga, over 1,208 Stuka missions were flown in an effort to eliminate them. Despite the heavy air bombardment (Stalingrad suffered heavier bombardment than Sedan or Sevastopol), the Soviet 62nd Army, with 47,000 men and 19 tanks, prevented the VI Armee and IV Panzerarmee from taking the west bank.

Soviet marines landing on the west bank of the Volga River.

The Luftwaffe retained air superiority into early November and Soviet daytime aerial resistance was nonexistent, but after flying 20,000 individual sorties, its original strength of 1,600 serviceable aircraft had fallen to 950. The Kampfwaffe (bomber force) had been hardest hit, having only 232 out of a force of 480 left. Despite enjoying qualitative superiority against the VVS and possessing 80% of the Luftwaffe's resources on the Eastern Front, Luftflotte 4 could not prevent Soviet aerial power from growing. By the time of the counter-offensive, the Soviets outnumbered it.

The Soviet bomber force, the Aviatsiya Dal'nego Deystviya (Long Range Aviation; ADD), having taken crippling losses over the past 18 months, was restricted to flying at night. The Soviets flew 11,317 night sorties over Stalingrad and the Don-bend sector between 17 July and 19 November. These raids caused little damage and were of nuisance value only.

The situation for the Luftwaffe was now becoming increasingly difficult. On 8 November, substantial units from Luftflotte 4 were withdrawn to combat the Allied landings in North Africa. The German air arm found itself spread thinly across Europe, and struggling to maintain its strength in the other southern sectors of the Soviet-German front. Meanwhile, the Soviet Army was being supplied by the American government under the Lend-Lease program. During the last quarter of 1942, the U.S. sent the Soviet Union 60,000 trucks, 11,000 jeeps, 2 million pairs of boots, 50,000 short tons (45,000 t) of explosives, 450,000 short tons (410,000 t) of steel and 250,000 short tons (230,000 t) of aviation gas. The majority of the American boots, which Stalin requested first, reached the troops. However, a part of the military equipment and food supplied by the USA was destroyed by German attacks, as that of Convoy PQ-17.

After three months of slow advance, the Germans finally reached the river banks, capturing 90% of the ruined city and splitting the remaining Soviet forces into two narrow pockets. Ice floes on the Volga now prevented boats and tugs from supplying the Soviet defenders. Nevertheless, the fighting, especially on the slopes of Mamayev Kurgan and inside the factory area in the northern part of the city, continued as fiercely as ever. The battles for the Red October Steel Factory, the Dzerzhinsky tractor factory and the Barrikady gun factory became world-famous.

Soviet counter-offensives

Recognizing that German troops were ill prepared for offensive operations during the winter and that most of them were redeployed elsewhere on the southern sector of the Eastern Front, the Stavka decided to conduct a number of offensive operations which took place between 19 November 1942 and 2 February 1943.

Seen in post-war history as a pivotal strategic period of war that began the Second Period of the Great Patriotic War (19 November 1942–31 December 1943), these operations opened the Winter Campaign of 1942-1943 (19 November 1942–3 March 1943), which involved some 15 Armies operating on several fronts.

Pavlov's House (1943).

The German offensive to take Stalingrad had been halted by a combination of stubborn Red Army resistance inside the city and local weather conditions. The Soviet counter-offensive planning used deceptive measures that eventually trapped and destroyed the 6th Army and other Axis forces around the city, becoming the second large scale defeat of the German Army during World War II.

German troops near the wreck of a T-34.

During the siege, the German and allied Italian, Hungarian, and Romanian armies protecting Army Group B's flanks had pressed their headquarters for support. The Hungarian 2nd Army, consisting of mainly ill-equipped and ill-trained units, was given the task of defending a 200 km (120 mi) section of the front north of Stalingrad between the Italian Army and Voronezh. This resulted in a very thin line, with some sectors where 1–2 km (0.62–1.2 mi) stretches were being defended by a single platoon. Soviet forces held several bridgeheads on the western bank of the river and presented a potentially serious threat to Army Group B.

Soviet infantry storming a factory in Stalingrad.

Similarly, on the southern flank of the Stalingrad sector the front southwest of Kotelnikovo was held only by the Romanian VII Corps, and beyond it, a single German division, the 16th Motorized Infantry.

Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers over Stalingrad.

However, Hitler was so focused on the city itself that requests from the flanks for support were refused. The Chief of the Army General Staff, Franz Halder, expressed concerns about Hitler's preoccupation with the city, pointing out that if the situation on the weak German flanks was not rectified, "there would be a disaster". Hitler told Halder that Stalingrad would be captured and the weakened flanks would be held with "national socialist ardour, clearly I cannot expect this of you (Halder)", and replaced him with General Kurt Zeitzler in mid-October.

Operation Uranus: the Soviet offensive

In autumn, the Soviet generals Georgy Zhukov and Aleksandr Vasilevsky, responsible for strategic planning in the Stalingrad area, concentrated massive forces in the steppes to the north and south of the city. The German northern flank was particularly vulnerable, since it was defended by Italian, Hungarian, and Romanian units that suffered from inferior equipment, morale, and leadership when compared with their German counterparts. This weakness was known and exploited by the Soviets, who preferred to face off against non-German troops whenever possible, just as the British preferred attacking Italian troops instead of German ones in North Africa. The plan was to keep pinning the Germans down in the city, then punch through the overstretched and weakly defended German flanks and surround the Germans inside Stalingrad. The flanks were to be attacked far enough away from Stalingrad so that the bulk of the 6th Army in Stalingrad could not redeploy to defend against the attack. During the preparations for the attack, Marshal Zhukov personally visited the front and noticing the poor organization, insisted on a one week delay in the start date of the planned attack. The operation was code-named "Uranus" and launched in conjunction with Operation Mars, which was directed at Army Group Center. The plan was similar to the one Zhukov had used to achieve victory at Khalkhin Gol three years before, where he had sprung a double envelopment and destroyed the 23rd Division of the Japanese army.

On 19 November 1942, the Red Army unleashed Operation Uranus. The attacking Soviet units under the command of Gen. Nikolay Vatutin consisted of three complete armies, the 1st Guards Army, 5th Tank Army, and 21st Army, including a total of 18 infantry divisions, eight tank brigades, two motorized brigades, six cavalry divisions and one anti-tank brigade. The preparations for the attack could be heard by the Romanians, who continued to push for reinforcements, only to be refused again. Thinly spread, outnumbered and poorly equipped, the Romanian 3rd Army, which held the northern flank of the German 6th Army, was shattered. On 20 November, a second Soviet offensive (two armies) was launched to the south of Stalingrad, against points held by the Romanian IV Corps. The Romanian forces, made up primarily of infantry, collapsed almost immediately. Soviet forces raced west in a pincer movement, and met two days later near the town of Kalach, sealing the ring around Stalingrad. This was not filmed at the time; the Soviets re-enacted the link-up for a propaganda film, which achieved worldwide fame.

The Soviet counter-attack at Stalingrad (Double click to enlarge).

About 290,000 German and Romanian soldiers, the Croatian 369th Reinforced Infantry Regiment and other volunteer subsidiary troops were surrounded. Inside the pocket (German: Kessel, literally "cauldron"), there were also around 10,000 Soviet civilians and several thousand Soviet soldiers the Germans had taken captive during the battle. Not all of the 6th Army was trapped; 50,000 soldiers were brushed aside outside the pocket. The Red Army units immediately formed two defensive fronts: a circumvallation facing inward and a contravallation facing outward.

Adolf Hitler had declared in a public speech (in the Berlin Sportpalast) on 30 September 1942 that the German army would never leave the city. At a meeting shortly after the Soviet encirclement, German army chiefs pushed for an immediate breakout to a new line on the west of the Don, but Hitler was at his Bavarian retreat of Obersalzberg in Berchtesgaden with the head of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring. When asked by Hitler, Göring replied, after being convinced by Hans Jeschonnek, that the Luftwaffe could supply the 6th Army with an "air bridge". This would allow the Germans in the city to fight on while a relief force was assembled.

Soviet forces attacking north of Stalingrad in late November of 1942.

A similar plan had been used a year earlier at the Demyansk Pocket, albeit on a much smaller scale: a corps at Demyansk rather than an entire army. Also, Soviet fighter forces had improved considerably in both quality and quantity in the intervening year. But the mention of the successful Demyansk air supply operation reinforced Hitler's own views, and was endorsed by Göring several days later.

The head of Luftflotte 4, Wolfram von Richthofen, tried to get this decision overturned. The 6th Army was the largest unit of this type in the world and almost twice as large as a regular German army unit, plus there was also a corps of the 4th Panzer Army trapped in the pocket. It should have been clear that supplying them by air was impossible; the maximum 117.5 short tons (106.6 t) they could deliver a day—based on the number of available aircraft and with only the airfield at Pitomnik to land at—was far less than the minimum 800 short tons (730 t) needed. To supplement the limited number of Junkers Ju 52 transports, the Germans used aircraft wholly inadequate for the role, such as the Heinkel He 177 bomber (some bombers performed adequately—the Heinkel He 111 proved to be quite capable and was much faster than the Ju 52). But Hitler backed Göring's plan and reiterated his order of "no surrender" to his trapped armies.

The air supply mission failed. Appalling weather conditions, technical failures, heavy Soviet anti-aircraft fire and fighter interceptions led to the loss of 488 German aircraft. The Luftwaffe failed to achieve even the daily supply of 117 short tons (106 t) that it had aircraft for. An average of 94 short tons (85 t) of supplies per day was delivered. The most successful day, 19 December, delivered only 289 short tons (262 t) of supplies in 154 flights. The supplies that did get through were often useless: one aircraft arrived with 20 t (22 short tons) of vodka and summer uniforms, another with supplies of black pepper and marjoram. Hitler's indecision on the purpose of Operation Winter Storm (either to allow a breakout or to open a corridor) meant that large quantities of fuel that would have helped with a breakout were shipped when food and ammunition would have been more useful. The transport aircraft that did land safely were used to evacuate technical specialists and sick or wounded men from the besieged enclave (some 42,000 in all).

Romanian troops near Stalingrad.

Initially, supply flights came in from the field at Tatsinskaya, called 'Tazi' by the German pilots. On 23 December, the Soviet 24th Tank Corps, commanded by Major-General Vasily Mikhaylovich Badanov, reached nearby Skassirskaya and in the early morning of 24 December, the tanks reached Tatsinskaya. Without any soldiers to defend the airfield, it was abandoned under heavy fire; in a little under an hour, 108 Ju 52s and 16 Ju 86s took off for Novocherkassk—leaving 72 Ju 52s and many other aircraft burning on the ground. A new base was established some 200 mi (320 km) from Stalingrad at Salsk, the additional distance another obstacle to the resupply efforts. Salsk was abandoned in turn by mid-January for a rough facility at Zverevo, near Shakhty. The field at Zverevo was attacked repeatedly on 18 January and a further 50 Ju 52s were destroyed.

The 6th Army slowly starved. Pilots were shocked to find the troops too exhausted and hungry to unload. Germans fought over the slightest scraps of bread. General Zeitzler, moved by their plight, began to limit himself to their slim rations at meal times. After a few weeks on such a diet, he had lost 26 lb (12 kg) and had become so emaciated that Hitler, annoyed, personally ordered him to start eating regular meals again.

The toll on the Transportgruppen was heavy. Some 266 Junkers Ju 52s were destroyed, ⅓ of the fleet's strength on the Eastern Front. The He 111 gruppen lost 165 aircraft in transport operations. Other losses included 42 Ju 86s, nine Fw 200 Condors, five He 177 bombers and a Ju 290. The Luftwaffe also lost close to 1,000 highly experienced bomber crew personnel. So heavy were the Luftwaffe's losses that four of Luftflotte 4's transport units (KGrzbV 700, KGrzbV 900, I./KGrzbV 1 and II./KGzbV 1) were "formally dissolved".

Luftwaffe losses

Aircraft losses of the Luftwaffe for the supply of the 6th Army at Stalingrad, and the recovery of wounded from 24 November 1942 to 31 January 1943:

Losses Aircraft type
269 Junkers Ju 52
169 Heinkel He 111
42 Junkers Ju 86
9 Focke-Wulf Fw 200
5 Heinkel He 177
1 Junkers Ju 290
Total: 495 Equivalent to five squadrons or more than an air corps

These losses amounted to about 50% of the total used units. In addition, the air supply was stopped for the training program and Luftwaffe sorties in other theaters of war had been significantly reduced to save fuel for use at Stalingrad.

Operation Little Saturn

Soviet forces consolidated their positions around Stalingrad, and fierce fighting to shrink the pocket began. Operation Winter Storm (Operation Wintergewitter), a German attempt to relieve the trapped army from the south, was successfully fended off by the Soviets in December. The full impact of the harsh Russian winter set in. The Volga froze solid, allowing the Soviets to supply their forces more easily. The trapped Germans rapidly ran out of heating fuel and medical supplies, and thousands started to die of frostbite, malnutrition, and disease.


On 16 December, the Soviets launched a second offensive, Operation Little Saturn, which attempted to punch through the Axis army on the Don and take Rostov. If successful, this offensive would have trapped the remainder of Army Group South, ⅓ of the entire German army in Russia, in the Caucasus. The Germans set up a "mobile defense" in which small units were to hold towns until supporting armor could arrive. From the Soviet bridgehead at Mamon, 15 divisions—supported by at least 100 tanks—attacked the Italian Cosseria and Ravenna Divisions, and although outnumbered 9 to 1, the Italians resisted until 19 December, when ARMIR headquarters finally ordered the battered divisions to withdraw. The Soviets never got close to Rostov, but the fighting forced von Manstein to extract Army Group A from the Caucasus and re-establish the frontline some 250 km (160 mi) away from the city. The Tatsinskaya Raid also caused significant losses to the Luftwaffe's transport fleet.

The 6th Army now was beyond all hope of German reinforcement. The German troops in Stalingrad were not told this, however, and continued to believe that reinforcements were on their way. Some German officers requested that Paulus defy Hitler’s orders to stand fast and instead attempt to break out of the Stalingrad pocket. Paulus refused, as he abhorred the thought of disobeying orders. Also, while a motorised breakout might have been possible in the first few weeks, the 6th Army now had insufficient fuel and the German soldiers would have faced great difficulty breaking through the Soviet lines on foot in harsh winter conditions.

Soviet gains (shown in blue) during Operation Little Saturn (Double click to enlarge).

Soviet victory

The Germans inside the pocket retreated from the suburbs of Stalingrad to the city itself. The loss of the two airfields, at Pitomnik on 16 January 1943 and Gumrak on either 25 January or the night of 21/22 January, meant an end to air supplies and to the evacuation of the wounded. The third and last serviceable runway was at the Stalingradskaja flight school, which reportedly had the last landings and takeoffs on the night of 22–23 January. After daybreak on 23 January, there were no more reported landings except for continuous air drops of ammunition and food until the end.

Generalfeldmarschall Friedrich Paulus (left), with his chief of staff, Generalleutnant Arthur Schmidt (middle) and his aide, Wilhelm Adam (right), after their surrender.

The Germans were now not only starving, but running out of ammunition. Nevertheless, they continued to resist, in part because they believed the Soviets would execute any who surrendered. In particular, the so-called "HiWis", Soviet citizens fighting for the Germans, had no illusions about their fate if captured. The Soviets were initially surprised by the number of Germans they had trapped, and had to reinforce their encircling troops. Bloody urban warfare began again in Stalingrad, but this time it was the Germans who were pushed back to the banks of the Volga. They fortified their positions in the factory districts and the Soviets encountered almost the same tooth-and-nail ferocity that they themselves displayed a month earlier. The Germans adopted a simple defense of fixing wire nets over all windows to protect themselves from grenades. The Soviets responded by fixing fish hooks to the grenades so they stuck to the nets when thrown. The Germans now had no usable tanks in the city. Those tanks which still functioned could at best be used as stationary cannons. The Soviets did not bother employing tanks in areas where the urban destruction restricted their mobility. A low-level Soviet envoy party (comprising Major Aleksandr Smyslov, Captain Nikolay Dyatlenko and a trumpeter) carried an offer to Paulus: if he surrendered within 24 hours, he would receive a guarantee of safety for all prisoners, medical care for the sick and wounded, prisoners allowed to keep their personal belongings, "normal" food rations, and repatriation to whatever country they wished to go to after the war; but Paulus—ordered not to surrender by Hitler—did not respond.

On 30 January 1943, the 10th anniversary of his coming to power, Hitler promoted Paulus to Generalfeldmarschall. Since no German Field Marshal had ever been taken prisoner, Hitler assumed that Paulus would fight on or take his own life. However, when Soviet forces closed in on his headquarters in the ruined GUM department store the next day, Paulus surrendered. The remnants of the Axis forces in Stalingrad surrendered on 2 February; 91,000 tired, ill, and starving prisoners were taken, including 3,000 Romanians, the survivors of the 20th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division and “Col. Voicu” Detachment. To the delight of the Soviet forces and the dismay of the Third Reich, the prisoners included 22 generals. Hitler was furious and confided that Paulus "could have freed himself from all sorrow and ascended into eternity and national immortality, but he prefers to go to Moscow."

759,560 Soviet personnel were awarded this medal for the defence of Stalingrad from 22 December 1942.

Other generals and officers fought until the end, and were killed in action or committed suicide, for example Generalleutnant Günther Angern, last commander of the 16. Panzer Division, suicide/killed in action at Stalingrad. General der Infanterie Alexander von Hartmann, commander of the 71. Infanterie Division, killed in action at Stalingrad. Generalmajor Bruno Chrobeck, commander of Infanterie Regiment 672, killed in action at Stalingrad. Generalleutnant Bernhard Steinmetz, commander of the 305. Infanterie Division, wounded; flew out of the Stalingrad encirclement. Generalleutnant Richard Stempel, last commander of the 371. Infanterie Division, suicide at Stalingrad. Generalmajor Erich Grosse, commander of Infanterie Regiment 276, killed in action at Stalingrad. Generalmajor Dipl. Ing. Johannes Schmidt, commander of Infanterie Regiment 191, wounded; flew out of the Stalingrad encirclement. Oberstleutnant i.G. Otto-Wilhelm Kurt von Menges: Ia (operations officer) of the 24.Panzer Division, killed in action at Stalingrad in February when he was heavily wounded in his chest by an explosion of a Russian bomb; other sources are telling he committed suicide. Oberstleutnant i. G. Otto Felix von Amsberg: Ia of the 371. Infanterie Division, killed in action at Stalingrad. Oberst i.G. Horst Wilutzky: Ia of the 376. Infanterie Division. Survived; flew out of the Stalingrad encirclement but the reason why he flew out is a bit unclear because some sources are telling he was wounded and other sources are telling he was ordered to fly out by General Eduard Wagner, the quartermaster-general of the German Army and a member of the resistance to Adolf Hitler (who was a good friend of Wilutzky).

Red Army soldier marches a German soldier into captivity.

The German public was not officially told of the disaster until the end of January 1943, though positive media reports had stopped in the weeks before the announcement. Stalingrad marked the first time that the Nazi government publicly acknowledged a failure in its war effort; it was not the first major setback of the German military, but the crushing defeat where German losses were almost equal to those of the Soviets was unprecedented. Prior losses of the Soviet Union were generally three times as high as the German ones. On 31 January, regular programming on German state radio was replaced by a broadcast of the somber Adagio movement from Anton Bruckner's Seventh Symphony, followed by the announcement of the defeat at Stalingrad.

On 18 February, Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels gave his famous Sportpalast speech in Berlin, encouraging the Germans to accept a total war which would claim all resources and efforts from the entire population.

The interrogation of Paulus at Don Front HQ: General Rokossovsky, Marshal Voronov, translator Nikolay Dyatlenko and Paulus (left to right).

According to the German documentary film Stalingrad, over 11,000 soldiers refused to lay down their arms at the official surrender, presumably believing that fighting to the death was better than a slow end in Soviet camps. They continued to resist, hiding in cellars and sewers, but by early March 1943, the remaining small and isolated pockets of resistance had surrendered. According to Soviet intelligence documents shown in the documentary, a remarkable NKVD report from March 1943 is available showing the tenacity of some of these German groups: "The mopping-up of counter-revolutionary elements in the city of Stalingrad proceeded. The German-fascist bandits - who had hidden themselves in huts and trenches - offered armed resistance after combat actions had already ended. This armed resistance continued until 15 February and in a few areas until 20 February. Most of the armed groups were liquidated by March... During this period of armed conflict with the German-fascist bandits, the brigade's units killed 2.418 soldiers and officers and captured 8.646 soldiers and officers, escorting them to POW camps and handing them over". The operative report of the Don Front's staff issued on 5 February 1943, 22.00 says: "...2.The 64th Army was putting itself in order, being in previously occupied regions. Location of army's units is as it was previously. In the region of location of the 38 Motorized Rifle Brigade in a basement 18 armed SS-men (sic) were found, who refused to surrender, the Germans found were destroyed. They gained time for the forces committed in the Third Battle of Kharkov that were supposed to link with them as part of a relieving force. In a report, Unteroffizier (O.A.) Karl-August Rombach from the Nachrichtenzug of II./Artillerie-Regiment 305 "stated his intention of using underground tunnels in the tractor factory to avoid captivity and await warmer weather. Many others had the same idea and thousands implemented their plans.

Of more than 91,000 German prisoners captured in Stalingrad, only about 5,000 ever returned. Already weakened by disease, starvation and lack of medical care during the encirclement, they were sent to labour camps all over the Soviet Union, where most of them died of disease (particularly typhus), cold, overwork, mistreatment and malnutrition. Some were kept in the city to help with rebuilding. In March 1943, 40,000 Germans were buried in a mass grave, victims of a typhus epidemic. A handful of senior officers were taken to Moscow and used for propaganda purposes, and some of them joined the National Committee for a Free Germany. Some, including Paulus, signed anti-Hitler statements which were broadcast to German troops. Paulus lived in the Soviet Union until 1952, then moved to Dresden in East Germany, where he spent the remainder of his days defending his actions at Stalingrad and was quoted as saying that Communism was the best hope for postwar Europe. General Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach offered to raise an anti-Hitler army from the Stalingrad survivors, but the Soviets did not accept. It was not until 1955 that the last of the handful of survivors were repatriated after a plea to the Politburo by Konrad Adenauer.

Casualties

Various scholars have estimated the Axis suffered from 500,000-850,000 casualties (killed, disabled, captured) among all branches of the German armed forces and its allies, many of them POWs who died in Soviet captivity between 1943 and 1955. Of the 91,000 German POWs taken at Stalingrad, 27,000 died within weeks and only 6,000 returned to Germany in 1955. The remainder of the POWs died in Soviet captivity. According to archival figures, the Red Army suffered a total of 1,129,619 total casualties; 478,741 men killed or missing and 650,878 wounded. These numbers are for the whole Stalingrad Area; in the city itself 750,000 were killed, captured, or wounded. The Soviet authorities executed approximately 13,500 Soviet soldiers during the battle, equivalent to an entire division. Also, from 955 to 40,000 Soviet civilians died in Stalingrad and its suburbs during a single week of aerial bombing as the German 4th Panzer and 6th armies approached the city; the total number of civilians killed in the regions outside the city is unknown. In all, the battle resulted in an estimated total of 1.7-2 million Axis and Soviet casualties.

Scope of the battle


At different times, the Germans had held up to 90% of the city, yet the Soviet forces fought on fiercely. At the end of the battle, the Soviet armies had encircled and besieged the 6th Army. Some elements of the German 4th Panzer Army also suffered casualties in operations around Stalingrad during the Soviet counter-offensive.

German mobility had been a significant factor in the Wehrmacht's earlier victories. Before Stalingrad, the Soviets had been able to amass their forces in sufficient numbers to achieve victory only around Moscow. Stalingrad, which had limited military value and had already been stripped of its assets, could have been bypassed and invested by the 6th Army in its drive to the Caucasus with Army Group A. Instead, Hitler chose to sacrifice many of his most experienced troops in vicious street fighting among urban rubble, which favoured the defenders and gave the Soviet Union time to amass and concentrate its forces for its pincer movement. Some Germans felt Hitler had sacrificed one of his largest and finest armies for prestige. The 6th Army was reconstituted in time for the Battle of Kursk, but was made up mostly of conscripts, and was never the force it had once been.

A significant factor in Germany's failure at Stalingrad was Hitler's pursuit of too many simultaneous objectives. To the South of Stalingrad, Army Group A was committed to capturing oilfields in the Caucasus and in particular at Baku in Azerbaijan. These oil fields were the original objective of the 1942 campaign, and he could have used Army Group A to bolster Army Group B's flanks around Stalingrad and perhaps to aid in fighting within the city. Clearly Hitler's ambitions were well beyond German means.

Besides being a turning point in the war, Stalingrad revealed the discipline and determination of both the German Wehrmacht and the Soviet Red Army. The Soviets first defended Stalingrad against a fierce German onslaught. So great were Soviet losses that at times, the life expectancy of a newly arrived soldier was less than a day, and the life expectancy of a Soviet officer was three days. Their sacrifice is immortalized by one of General Rodimtsev's soldiers, about to die, who scratched on the wall of the main railway station—which changed hands 15 times during the battle—“Rodimtsev’s Guardsmen fought and died here for their Motherland.”

A significant historical debate concerns the degree of terror in the Red Army. The British historian Anthony Beevor noted the claim from the Stalingrad Front’s Political Department on 8 October 1942 that: “The defeatist mood is almost eliminated and the number of treasonous incidents is getting lower” as an example of the sort of coercion that the Special Detachments (later to be renamed SMERSH) subjected the Red Army soldiers to. On the other hand, Beevor noted the often extraordinary bravery of the Soviet soldiers in a battle that was only comparable to Verdun, and argued that such self-sacrifice cannot be explained by terror alone.

For the heroism of the Soviet defenders of Stalingrad, the city was awarded the title Hero City in 1945. Twenty-four years after the battle, in October 1967, a colossal monument, Mother Motherland, was erected on Mamayev Kurgan, the hill overlooking the city. The statue forms part of a War memorial complex which includes ruined walls deliberately left the way they were after the battle. The Grain Silo, as well as Pavlov's House, the apartment building whose defenders eventually held out for two months until they were relieved, can still be visited. Even today one may find bones and rusty metal splinters on Mamayev Kurgan, symbols of both the human suffering during the battle and the successful yet costly resistance.

Many women fought on the Soviet side, or were under fire. At the beginning of the battle there were 75,000 women and girls from the Stalingrad area who had finished military or medical training, and all of whom were to serve in the battle. Women staffed a great many of the anti-aircraft batteries that fought not only the Luftwaffe but German tanks. Soviet nurses not only treated wounded men under fire but were involved in the highly dangerous work of bringing wounded soldiers back to the hospitals under enemy fire. Many of the Soviet wireless and telephone operators were women who often suffered heavy casualties when their command posts came under fire. Though women were not usually trained as infantry, many Soviet women fought as machine gunners, mortar operators, and scouts. Women were also snipers at Stalingrad. Three air regiments at Stalingrad were entirely female. At least three women won the title Hero of the Soviet Union while driving tanks at Stalingrad.

The German Army showed remarkable discipline after being surrounded. It was the first time that it had operated under adverse conditions on such a scale. During the latter part of the siege, short of food and clothing, many German soldiers starved or froze to death. Yet, discipline was maintained until the very end, when resistance no longer served any useful purpose. Friedrich Paulus obeyed Hitler's orders, against many of Hitler's top generals' counsel and advice, including that of von Manstein, and did not attempt to break out of the city. German ammunition, supplies, and food became all too scarce.

Paulus knew that the airlift had failed and that Stalingrad was lost. He asked for permission to surrender to save the lives of his troops, but Hitler refused and instead promoted him to the rank of Generalfeldmarschall. No German officer of this rank had ever surrendered, and the implication was clear: if Paulus surrendered, he would shame himself and would become the highest ranking German officer ever to be captured. Hitler believed that Paulus would either fight to the last man or commit suicide. Paulus surrendered, commenting, "I have no intention of shooting myself for this Bohemian corporal".

The aftermath of the Battle of Stalingrad.
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